Judicial Discipline in California: A Critical Re-Evaluation by Roche, Wilbank J.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
12-1-1976
Judicial Discipline in California: A Critical Re-
Evaluation
Wilbank J. Roche
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wilbank J. Roche, Judicial Discipline in California: A Critical Re-Evaluation, 10 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 192 (1976).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol10/iss1/6
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE IN CALIFORNIA:
A CRITICAL RE-EVALUATION
I. INTRODUCTION
California was the first state to create a governmental agency
(the Commission on Judicial Qualifications) with express and author-
ity to receive and review complaints against judges, to conduct inqui-
ries and make investigations, and to give disciplinary recommendations
where necessary. More than sixteen years have elapsed since the
Commission's inception. Many incipient problems not readily appar-
ent at the outset have come to the surface, and other new ones have
arisen. It is therefore very appropriate at this juncture to critically
re-evaluate California's system of judicial discipline. Such a re-appraisal
can be valuable not only as a means of identifying the useful aspects
of the system which should be retained, as well as the useless ones
that should be abandoned, but also as a vehicle for clarifying its purpose
and goals. It is only by this type of introspection that 'a more effective
system can be developed.
The ensuing analysis will explore the strengths and weaknesses
of judicial discipline as it has developed in California during the last
decade and one-half. The objective will be to clearly demonstrate the
need, and furnish the justifications, for certain recommended changes
that must be made if the system is to be utilized to its fullest potential
in the years to come.
II. BACKGROUND
Prior to 1960, the laws of California provided only three means for
removing unfit judges from office: Impeachment;1 recall;2 and concur-
1. In a typical impeachment proceeding, the lower house of a bicameral legislature
drafts charges against the official sought to be removed. These charges are called arti-
cles of impeachment. It is then left to the upper house, acting as judge and jury, to
consider and weigh the evidence on its merits. For a structural breakdown of impeach-
ment provisions in various state constitutions, see Braithwaite, Judicial Discipline and
Removal, AM. Jun. Soc'Y REP. No. 5 at 22-30 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Braithwaite
-Judicial Discipline]. As a general rule, the impeaching body will have the responsi-
bility for presenting evidence to the trier of fact. Thus, the lower house in most cases
may prosecute the matter itself, or it may appoint the state's attorney general to do the
job. In some instances, special outside counsel will be brought in to prosecute the offi-
cial. See, e.g., Stewart, Impeachment of James H. Hardy, 1862, 28 S. CAL. L. Rap. 61,




The first impeachment of a California judge occurred in 1862 when
James H. Hardy, a judge of the superior court, was brought to account
before the members of the state Senate.5 Most of the articles of
torney General of California and special counsel were used in the first impeachment of
a judge in California. Some interesting problems arose as to who actually had control
of the case, with special counsel prevailing. Id. at 67.
2. Recall, similar to the initiative and referendum, requires the incumbent official to
submit to a special type of vote-of-confidence proceeding. Standard provisions in state
constitutions, or in city or county charters provide that the procedure be initiated by
publishing a statement of general grounds for the recall. A petition is then circulated
among the electorate and a specified number of signatures must be obtained within a
certain period before the recall election can occur. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 23, §§
1-7 (West Supp. 1975). Recall, however, is not a widely used tool of removal and is
available under the constitutions of only seven states. See Braithwaite-Judicial Disci-
pline, supra note 1, at 3.
3. Concurrent resolution, very much like the more commonly known procedure of ad-
dress, requires a resolution and vote by two-thirds of the legislature for the removal of
an official to be effected. See Braithwaite-Judicial Discipline, supra note 1, at 3. See
also Frankel, Judicial Conduct and Removal of Judges for Cause in California, 36 S.
CAL. L. R1v. 72, 76 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Frankel-udicial Conduct]; McCoy,
A Note on Judicial Ethics in California, 22 S. CAL. L. REv. 240, 246 (1949)- [here-
inafter cited as McCoy].
4. The constitutional provision reads as follows:
Sec. 18. (a) The assembly has the sole power of impeachment. Impeachments shall
be tried by the Senate. A person may not be convicted unless, by rollcall vote en-
tered in the journal, two thirds of the membership of the Senate concurs.
(b) State officers elected on a statewide basis, members of the State Board of
Equalization, and judges of state courts are subject to impeachment for misconduct
in office. Judgment may extend only to removal from office under the State, but
the person convicted or acquitted remains subject to criminal punishment according
to law.
CAL. CONsT. art. 4, § '18 (1966) (emphasis added). Present section 18, a combination
of former sections 17 and 18, was added to the California Constitution in November of
1966, and it included several significant changes. Former section 18 provided, in
part, that "the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, the Judges
of the District Court of Appeal, and Judges of the Superior Court shall be liable
to impeachment for any misdemeanor in office." (Emphasis added). Judges of
the municipal and justice courts, not otherwise specifically mentioned, were none-
theless thought to be included under another provision of former section 18 which
read: "All other civil officers shall be tried for misdemeanor in office in such manner
as the Legislature may provide." (Emphasis added). See McCoy, supra note 3, at 250.
The language of present section 18 now specifically includes all "judges of the state
courts," and makes "misconduct in office" sufficient cause for removal, as opposed to
the narrow ground of misdemeanor used in former section 18. CAL. CoNsT. art. 4, §
18 (1966). This change represents a considerable broadening and eliminates certain
problems which have arisen in the past. See discussion note 10 infra with regard to
the sufficiency of charges in the impeachment trial of James Hardy.
5. Prior to this, in 1857, both the State Controller and the State Treasurer were im-
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impeachment contained charges of various kinds of corrupt judicial con-
duct,6 and Judge Hardy was also accused of having behaved publicly
in a manner not consistent with the judicial office.7  The most serious
accusation made was that Judge Hardy had conspired with the District
Attorney of San Raphael, Main County, to fix the trial of David S.
Terry, a former Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court who was
then on trial for the murder of a United States Senator.8 In addition,
Judge Hardy, a man vehemently outspoken in favor of slavery, was
charged with having violated his duty and oath to uphold the Constitu-
tion of the United States of America.9 Following a trial that lasted
fourteen days, an oral vote was taken among the Senators and Judge
Hardy was acquitted of all charges except disloyalty to his country. As
a result, he was immediately removed from office." Within a few
years, however, the political climate of the nation had changed as had
the partisan make-up of the California legislature, and Hardy's friends
were able to remove the stigma of his conviction by pushing through
peached and convicted of defrauding the State. See J. BEEK, TRIAL OF THE . IMPEACH-
MENT OF JUDGE CARLOS S. HARDY, Introduction X (1930) [hereinafter cited as BEEK].
For an account of the events surrounding Judge James Hardy's impeachment trial, see
Stewart, supra note 1; and for a complete transcript of the entire proceedings, see OF-
FICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. HARDY, APPENDIX TO
JOURNALS OF SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, 13th SEss. (1862).
6. Stewart, supra note 1, at 62.
7. Id. Apparently Judge Hardy had a habit of becoming intoxicated and boisterous
in public places.
8. Id. Terry slew Senator David Broderick in a duel brought about by an argument
over the slavery question. In Sacramento, the public reaction against Terry, who fa-
vored slavery, was running very high. Broderick was catapulted into martyrdom for the
cause of black freedom, and Terry became the sacrificial lamb. Realizing the gravity
of his situation, Terry moved for a change of venue. His case was transferred to San
Raphael where it was assigned to Judge Hardy's court. On the day of the trial, the main
witnesses for the prosecution were late in arriving. In spite of the fact that it was
known they would be along soon, Judge Hardy insisted upon proceeding on schedule,
without them. A jury was impaneled and the trial commenced. Two hours later, the
witnesses still not having appeared, the case was submitted to the jury. With no one
to testify against him, Terry was acquitted.
9. Id. Judge Hardy was alleged to have made expressions of sympathy toward Jeffer-
son Davis, the Confederacy, and secession, and to have made statements disrespectful
of the Constitution and the American flag. Id.
10. From the start, Hardy's counsel had been quick to point out that none of the nine-
teen specific charges against the judge was an indictable or impeachable offense accord-
ing to then existing California law. Based on this he argued that the charges were insuf-
ficient to sustain a conviction. The prosecution counter-argued that the language of the
constitution included within it that conduct which would have constituted a misdemeanor
or otherwise impeachable offense at common law. Since this whole proceeding was pri-
marily a political vendetta, the Senate naturally adopted the prosecution's position. Id.
at 67.
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a special measure expunging it from the Senate records. 1
Sixty-seven years later, in 1929, the second and only other impeach-
ment of a California judge took place. As a consequence of apparently
well-intentioned but improper attempts to furnish legal counsel to his
longtime friend, the evangelist Aimee Semple McPherson, Judge
Carlos S. Hardy was impeached for having practiced law while sitting
as a judge of the superior court, in violation of the California Constitu-
tion, and for having attempted to make a theater of his courtroom.1 2
After twenty-two days of hearings, the Senate acquitted Judge Hardy
of all charges brought against him by the State Assembly.' 3
11. Id. at 63, 64. A primarily Democratic legislature of 1869-70 found Judge Hardy's
conviction to be illegal and void, the result of political emotionalism. In the interest
of fair dealing, it was deemed a blemish on the Senate records, which should be removed.
Accordingly, the Secretary of the Senate was instructed to "draw black lines around said
judgment and write across the face thereof the words, 'Expunged..... " Id.
12. For the complete transcript of the proceedings before, during, and after the trial,
see BEEK, supra note 5.
Specifically, Judge Hardy was alleged to have given Miss McPherson legal advice con-
cerning her business enterprise, The Echo Park Evangelistic Association, Inc. Also, in
June of 1926, after Miss McPherson had returned from an unexplained absence of six
weeks, claiming to have been kidnapped and causing the Grand Jury and the District
Attorney's office to investigate the matter, the Judge was alleged to have willfully with-
held information tending to prove Miss McPherson had never been kidnapped. Since
Miss McPherson was under felony suspicion for having "cried wolf" as a publicity stunt,
Judge Hardy's action amounted to obstructing justice. Further, he "delivered public ad-
dresses over the radio and on the public platform, in character directly designed to create
such favorable public opinion and to create sentiment favorable to . . . Aimee Semple
McPherson in the minds of the . . . [Grand] jurors, and in the minds of the citizens
of . . . Los Angeles County who might be called as trial jurors in the event . . . [Miss]
McPherson was . . ." prosecuted. Id. at 14. In this regard he was further charged
with having taken $2,500 in payment for his services. Id.
Perhaps the most interesting charge relates to an incident that occurred in 1928.
Judge Hardy was about to try a case which had aroused great public interest. He
"caused the seats provided for spectators in his court room . . . to be numbered and
caused tickets to be printed and numbers endorsed thereon . . . which. . . tickets were
dated for the various days during which it was contemplated that the case . . . would
be on trial, and caused and permitted said tickets to be distributed to the friends of said
Carlos S. Hardy, and of his wife, to the end that no persons except those provided with
said tickets would be admitted to the court room during the trial .... ." Id. at 17. Orig-
inally these charges were drawn in five articles, but Judge Hardy demurred to all of
them. His motion was unanimously denied except as to the last article relating to the
"distribution of tickets" charge. Id. at 110-12.
13. Id. at 1334-49. More significant than the Judge's acquittal was the related ruling
of the California Supreme Court in State Bar of California v. Superior Court, 207 Cal.
323, 278 P. 432 (1929). Prior to the commencement of the impeachment proceedings
in the legislature, the State Bar had called Judge Hardy before the Board of Governors
to account for certain behavior in regard to Miss McPherson, namely, that he was prac-
ticing law while on the bench in violation of CAL. CoNsT. art. 6, § 22 (presently § 17).
Although he was willing to appear before the Board, Judge Hardy refused to testify,
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Notwithstanding the prevalence of impeachment provisions in state
constitutions throughout the country,14 research and experience have
shown that as a method of effectively removing unfit judges it is little
used and of no real value.15 Impeachment is both cumbersome and
wastefully expensive in that it demands the time and energies of some
or all members of both houses of a legislature for extended periods.10
claiming that there was no jurisdiction over him since he was a judge and not a member
of the bar during his tenure on the bench. The Board sought a writ of mandamus com-
pelling Judge Hardy's testimony, but The Honorable Marshall F. McComb, then judge
of the Superior Court, denied it, agreeing with Judge Hardy's position. On appeal to
the supreme court, the ruling was affirmed and the court inferred that impeachment was
the only available method of disciplining a judge on these facts. State Bar of California
v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. 323, 278 P. 432 (1929).
One effect of the decision was to foreclose a potentially useful avenue of redress
against wayward judges. In spite of this, the decision was a good one because of the
undesirability of placing any control of judge's behavior in the hands of the bar. See
Frankel-udicial Conduct, supra note 3, at 76, 77. Several years later, the State Bar
decision was distinguished in Christopher v. State Bar, 26 Cal. 2d 663, 161 P.2d 1
(1945). Christopher involved a similar proceeding against a justice of the peace for
having practiced law while serving on the bench. The supreme court held that State
Bar was not applicable in Christopher because justices of the peace were not under the
constitutional proscription not to practice law that Judge Hardy had been under. Thus,
insofar as the judge of a justice court was "permitted" by the constitution to practice
law, he was under the jurisdiction of the State Bar when he did so.
14. Braithwaite asserts that impeachment has been the most widely adopted of the tra-
ditional removal procedures, having been provided for in the constitutions of the United
States and forty-six of the sister states. See Braithwaite-Judicial Discipline, supra
note 1, at 3.
15. In 1936, it was reported in 20 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 133, 151 n.86 that during the
period 1900-25 only two judges were removed from office by impeachment; one was in
Montana and the other in Texas. A 1952 survey indicated that in the twenty year pe-
riod from 1928-48, only three impeachments were conducted throughout the country; in
all three the defense prevailed. Brand, The Discipline of Judges, 46 A.B.A.J. 1315 n. 2
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Brand]. In the same note, the results of the author's fur-
ther independent survey, conducted in 1960, showed that of forty states, for as far back
as could be determined, only seventeen had instituted impeachment proceedings in a to-
tal of fifty-two instances. From these statistics, Mr. Brand justifiably concluded the
remedy was useless. In the federal courts, there have been only eight impeachment
trials, and four of those have resulted in acquittals. See Tydings, Congress and the
Courts Helping Judiciary to Help Itself, 52 A.B.A.J. 321, 322 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Tydings].
16. For example, in Florida two impeachment trials were undertaken during the years
1957-63. In each case it was necessary to call special sessions of the legislature due
to lack of time in the regular session. The cost of the two trials was nearly $250,000,
an amount greater than 50% of the annual budget of the Florida Supreme Court. See
Winters and Allard, Judicial Selection and Tenure in the U.S., in THE COURTS, THE
PUBLIC, AND THE LAw EXPLOSION 167, 168 (H. Jones ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as
Winters and Allard].
As far back as 1800, a proposal was made to amend the Constitution of the United
States to provide for removal by address. See Tydings, supra note 15, at 322. See also
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A legislature's time is ill-spent in having to charge, try, and ultimately
judge members of the bench who are believed unqualified for further
service to the judiciary. Moreover, the very nature of the impeachment
proceeding gives it strong political overtones.1 7  From the standpoint
of administering justice, this is dangerous and undesirable. Justice
Fred B. Wood's remark cQncerning the sentiments of the California
Legislature following the impeachment of Judge Carlos S. Hardy was
particularly incisive: ". . . I don't think there was a single member
of the Senate who sat at that trial who wanted to see another
one. .. .
B. Recall19
The single use of the recall to remove members of the California
judiciary was made in 1932, only three years after the impeachment
of Judge Carlos S. Hardy, when the Board of Trustees of the Los
Angeles County Bar Association voted to initiate proceedings against
three local judges of the superior court: John L. Fleming, Dailey S.
Stafford, and Walter Guerin. 20  A prior investigation by the Associa-
note 3 supra. Thomas Jefferson is also known to have written to his good friend Judge
Roane in 1819 that the impeachment method of removing judges did not even serve as
a deterrent to judicial misconduct. See 1 WARREN, TH-, SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HisTO y 295 (1922); Tydings, supra note 15, at 322. One writer has noted that
in the federal system attendance has been a crucial problem during impeachment trials,
and he states that an average of only 16 senators out of a possible 96 have been present
during the trials of federal judges. See J. BoRKmN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE 194, 195 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as BonxN]. Senator Tydings points out that in view of the numerous
other responsibilities that senators are obligated to meet, it is no surprise that attendance
has been low at the impeachment trials of federal judges. Tydings, supra note 15, at
323. (As a sidenote, it is interesting to observe that both California impeachments were
very well attended. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 64; BEEK, supra note 5, at xii).
17. See Burke, Judicial Discipline and Removal: The California Story, 48 J. AM.
JUD. Soc'Y 167, 169 n.1 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Burke]; Stewart, supra note 1, at
168.
18. JOINT JUDICIARY COMMITrEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, PARTIAL RE-
PORT ON THE CALIFORNIA JUDIcIARY 48 (1959) [hereinafter cited as PARTIAL REPORT]
(testimony of Justice Wood before the Committee), quoted in Frankel-Judicial Con-
duct, supra note 3, at 75.
19. CAL. CoNsT. art. 23, § 1 defines recall as "the power of the electors to remove
an elective officer." In substance the California provisions require the filing of a peti-
tion with the Secretary of State setting out the reasons for recall. "Sufficiency of reason
is not reviewable." Id. § 2. Petitioners then have 160 days to get the required number
of signatures, which is 20% of the number of votes cast for the particular office in the
last election. Once the petition is filed, the Governor must call an election within 60-
80 days. Id. § 3. A majority vote will be sufficient for removal. Id. (Present article
23 was added and former article 23 was repealed Nov. 5, 1974). For the remainder
of the provisions concerning recall, see id. §§ 4-7.
20. A full account of the proceedings from the inception of the investigations up to
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tion's Judiciary Committee revealed substantial evidence that these
three judges were using their positions to further their own economic
and political goals in total disregard for established judicial ethics. One
of the specific charges was that they had named acquaintances (in some
cases altogether incompetent) to certain lucrative receiverships under
their appointment. In other instances, the judges were alleged to have
awarded their appointee-acquaintances unduly large fees, and at least
one of the three was accused of attempting to persuade his appointees
to bank at an institution in which he had previously owned an interest.2 '
Using the information gathered against the judges as support, a
specially appointed Recall Committee was successful in gathering more
than 100,000 signatures for each recall petition. Subsequently, an
appropriate measure was placed upon the November, 1932 ballot.
22
After a vigorous campaign on both sides, all three of the judges were
recalled from office.
Undoubtedly, the removal of Judges Fleming, Stafford, and Guerin
was a satisfying victory for the outraged public and one much needed
to restore respectability to the judiciary. Yet, when the committee's
reports are studied, it is painfully clear that recall was-in terms of
money, time, and manpower expended-probably an even worse
method of removal than impeachment had been. 23  Equally distressing,
". .. the recall authority provides no reasonable or orderly [or inde-
the filing of the final report by the Recall Committee can be found in 7 L.A.B. BULL.
227-45 (1932) and in 8 L.A.B. BULL. 3-10, 24, 67, 69 (1932).
21. 7 L.A.B. BULL. at 242; 8 L.A.B. BuLL. at 4-8.
22. 8 L.A.B. BULL. at 5. The accounts indicate there was strong public support for
the removal of the judges. A large number of civic groups and law-related organizations
pledged their support to the Committee. It is also interesting to note that 87% of the
persons solicited for signature cooperated by signing the recall petitions, and of those
an exceptionally high 86% proved to be valid. Id.
23. In addition to the countless man-hours that went into the investigations by the Ju-
diciary Committee, as well as those that went into the petition solicitations (the cost
of which amounted to $8,648.57), it soon became apparent to the Recall Committee that
a full scale campaign would have to be launched in order to counteract the individual
campaigns "of considerable proportions" which the three judges had undertaken. Much
confusion resulted both from the electorate's unfamiliarity with the procedure as well
as from the conflicting propaganda. Great expenditures of time and money were
necessitated on all sides. The cost to the Recall Committee was $2,248.96; it is not
reported what amounts the judges spent. Id. at 67, 69. One also wonders what price
the administration of local justice paid in all this. Judges Fleming, Stafford, and Guerin
were still in office and theoretically, at least, carrying out their judicial duties during
this bitter struggle.
As it turned out, one of the more ironic facts was that the Board chose to use the
recall only because, on studying impeachment, it concluded that such "proceedings
against members of the Bench in California clearly shows that it is cumbersome and
ineffective." Id. at 4, 5.
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pendent] way for charges of misconduct or mental or physicial unfit-
ness of a judge to be properly initiated, examined, and adjudicated.
'24
C. Concurrent Resolution25
California's single aborted experience with concurrent resolution as
an implement of removal came in 1936, just four years after the
removal of Judges Fleming, Stafford, and Guerin.2" In 1935, Judge
Gavin W. Craig of the California District Court of Appeal was convicted
in federal court of conspiring to obstruct the administration of justice.
He was fined $1,000 and sentenced to one year in prisonY.2  In 1937
at the insistence of the California State Bar, the legislature initiated
concurrent resolution proceedings in order to remove Judge Craig
from office. 28  Just five days before the hearings by a joint convention
were scheduled to convene, however, Judge 'Craig resigned his posi-
tion, obviating the need for any further aqtion on the part of the legis-
lature. 20  Likewise, simultaneous efforts (based upon different provi-
sions of the law) by the California Attorney General to remove Judge
Craig from office were also mooted.a°
24. Frankel-Judicial Conduct, supra note 3, at 76.
25. CAL. CONST. art. 6, former § 10, -which was repealed Nov. 8, 1966, provided in
part: "Justices of the Supreme Court and of the District Courts of Appeal, and judges
of the superior courts may be removed by concurrent resolution of both houses of the
Legislature adopted by a two-thirds vote of each house. All other judicial officers, ex-
cept justices of the peace, may be removed by the Senate on recommendation of the Gov-
ernor;..."
26. There is some indication that during the twenties the public image of the judiciary
had suffered considerably; the general feeling was that the "ability, efficiency, and dig-
nity" of America's judges was on the wane. BErY, supra note 5, at 1346 (Senator
George W. Rochester's explanation of his vote in the Carlos S. Hardy impeachment
trial). This would partially explain the run in California on judicial removals during
the ten year period from 1926 to 1936. One thing is certain: The total absence of re-
moval proceedings. between 1862 and 1929 cannot have been due to the fact that none
of the judges in the state misbehaved or was otherwise incapacitated. More likely, it
was simply because the judiciary was not in the public eye.
27. Craig v. United States, 81 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1936).
The evidence tended to show that one John McKeon and others were being prosecuted
in federal court for having perpetrated a corporate mail fraud. Justice Craig, in return
for a large campaign contribution to a certain U.S. Senator's fund, was found to have
offered to open channels in Washington that might lead to a dismissal of the indictment.
It was Craig's position that the charges were unfounded, as McKeon's dismissal was to
be based on the merits.
28. See AssEM. DAIIY J., Jan. 12, 1937 at 67; SEN. DAILY J., Jan. 11, 1937, at 22;
AssEM. DAILY J., Jan. 6, 1937 at 14-16. The concurrent resolution proceedings were
brought pursuant to the provisions of CAL. CONST. art. 6, former § 18 (repealed Nov.
8, 1966), which are now contained in present § 17 (added Nov. 8, 1966).
29. See McCoy, supra note 3, at 252; Frankel-Judicial Conduct, supra note 3, at 74.
30. See McCoy, supra note 3, at 252; Frankel-Judicial Conduct, supra note 3, at 74.
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Once again, despite the beneficial result ultimately obtained, much
of the time, effort, and expense that went into achieving Justice Craig's
resignation could have been spared, had there been a more simplified,
efficient, and expeditious procedure available.
By 1937 then, each of California's three traditional methods for
removing unfit judges, although not totally ineffective, had proven itself
to be awkward, inefficient, and incapable of meeting the demands
of a viable system of judicial discipline. s' During the 1940's, profound
tremors of change began rumbling from within the judiciary and with-
The Attorney General filed suit against Craig in an action which sought his removal
pursuant to what is now CAr.. Gov'T ConE § 1770(h) (West 1966). This section of
the code declares an office vacant upon the official's conviction of a felony or other
offense involving a violation of his official duties. Although the Attorney General was
successful at the trial court level, the supreme court reversed on appeal, saying that the
statute didn't apply to justices of the district court of appeal who could be removed
only pursuant to constitutional provisions. People v. Craig, 61 P.2d 934 (1936), va-
cated, 9 Cal. 2d 615, 72 P.2d 135 (1937). Rehearing was granted, but before the case
came up for hearing, Justice Craig had resigned. The issue was then held to be moot.
9 Cal. 2d 615, 72 P.2d 135 (1937). On the heels of the supreme court's holding, the
State Bar proposed a constitutional amendment, adopted the following year, which gave
the supreme court power to remove a judge upon conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. From the time of its adoption in 1937, the provision was not used until 1962
when Judge Marvin Sherwin was removed after conviction on three counts of income
tax evasion and making false declarations under oath. In Re Sherwin, S.F. No. 21064
(Minute Order dated 6/4/62). This provision was also used the following year to re-
move two judges in the Mendocino area who had engaged in an illegal "warrant battle."
In re Tindall, In re Evans, 60 Cal. 2d 469, 386 P.2d 473, 34 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1963).
Unfortunately, Justice Craig had yet another due to pay: Disbarment proceedings were
brought against him. In September of 1938, his name was formally removed from the
rolls of the California State Bar Association. For a good general discussion of this area
of development, see Frankel-Judicial Conduct, supra note 3, at 76, 77; and McCoy,
supra note 3, at 251-52.
31. See Frankel-Judicial Conduct, supra note 3, at 76. Speaking of the problem
from a national standpoint, Winters and Allard have stated:
All three devices have glaring defects. They provide an inflexible remedy, outright
removal, and hence are unsuitable for dealing with the most common types of judi-
cial misconduct, which warrant some form of discipline short of removal. . . . In
situations involving anything less than the most flagrant violations of judicial ethics,
or indisputable incompetency, legislators and citizens hesitate to take the trouble to
initiate removal procedures.
Winters and Allard, supra note 16, at 167-68.
California's Senator Weller made similar observations in the late 1920's when, by way
of explanation to his vote in the impeachment trial of Judge Carlos S. Hardy, he stated:
I am not satisfied that the accused acted with a wilfull or corrupt motive. However,
I am convinced that. . . he voluntarily placed himself in such a position . . . that
he was guilty of unethical conduct, and conduct unbecoming a . . . judge of our
superior court ...
BEEK, supra note 5, at 1346. See generally BoRKIN, supra note 16, at 194-95; PARTIAL
REPORT, supra note 18; Brand, supra note 15, at 1315 n.2; Tydings, supra note 15, at
321.
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out, and by the mid-1950's they had reached such an intensity that
serious reform could no longer be avoided.3 2 Finally, in 1960, under
32. For an excellent and exhaustive treatment of the California developments in this
area from 1936 to 1960, see Frankel-Judicial Conduct, supra note 3, at 77-87.
Briefly, there were several attempts during the period from 1936 until 1958 to effect
the badly needed changes in the judicial system. Unfortunately, none of them were suc-
cessful. It was finally the shocking conduct of certain judges, as incredible as it was
intolerable, coupled with growing interest and pressure from all sides, that in the middle
and late fifties finally brought matters to a point where the problem could no longer
be left unsolved. For example, "[i]n one county we had three judges, none of whom had
been on the bench for a year. One of them hadn't been on the bench for two years.
One of them was in an institution. And they were all drawing salary." Testimony of
Chief Justice Gibson before the Joint Judiciary Committee on the Administration of Jus-
tice, PARTIAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 50. That same report relates the case of one 68
year old municipal court judge "who, pleading ill health, ceased holding court in Decem-
ber, 1955, remained idle throughout 1956 and the first eight months of 1957, held sessions
for nine mornings during the next month, then laid off again. As of the end of 1957
he had received more than $33,000 in salary for nine mornings' work." Id. Apparently,
the same judge, although suffering from a heart condition, was seen frequently on the
golf course during the period of absence froih the bench. Frankel, Removal of
Judges: California Tackles an Old Problem, 49 A.B.A.J. 166, 169 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Frankel-Removal]. In another county, serious difficulties had arisen due to the
prolonged absence from the bench of one lower court judge because of crippling illness,
and the inability of a second judge to perform his duties due to. age and poor health.
Id. at 169. In PARIAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 29 the following finding was made: "A
handful of judges, superior and municipal, have conducted a flourishing marriage busi-
ness in their courts, some of them frequently interrupting trials to perform the nuptial
rites. [It is reported in Remedies for Judicial Misconduct and Disability: Removal and
Discipline of Judges, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 149, 176 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Remedies]
that one female judge interrupted her court on seventeen occasions in a single day to per-
form weddings, in a pink robe!] Despite an express constitutional provision against ac-
cepting fees, some judges have habitually demanded a fee after the ceremony ....
Such fees have grossed some judges up to $10,000 a year." See generally Farley, Court
Survey, 33 CAL. ST. BAR J. 271, 272-74 (1958). In addition, there was extensive evidence
in the San Francisco area of probate judges appointing as many as two additional, un-
needed appraisers to evaluate a single estate. These superfluous appointees did nothing,
but were paid the full statutory fee. PARTIAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 14-19. Finally
the report noted additional examples of judges being drunk on the bench, refusing to hear
certain types of cases, failing to decide or try cases within a reasonable time (in some
instances due to the judge having taken up to a three month vacation), and of holding
unusually short court hours. These findings were corroborated by the testimony of
Chief Justice Gibson. Id. at 49.
In spite of the fact that the number of misbehaving or unfit judges was quite small
in relation to the total, the effect of their being permitted to remain on the bench was
to cast an undeserved but tainting shadow on the entire judiciary. It was also during
this period that the well known Holbrook Report was published, recommending the adop-
tion of new methods of removal. J. HoLuROoK, A SURvEY OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL
CoURTs-Los ANGELES AREA (1956). See also White, Should Judges be Subject to Dis-
ciplinary Action?, 32 L.A.B. BuLL. 99 (1957).
The ills mentioned in this footnote were by no means peculiar to California. Every
state in the nation, as well as the federal system, was suffering similar problems. See
Frankel, The Case for Judicial Disciplinary Measures, 49 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 218, 222-
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the ever increasing strain of adverse public and professional opinion,
the California Commission on Judicial Qualifications was created.8"
23 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Frankel-Measures]; Frankel, Removal of Judge-Fed-
eral and State, 48 J. Am. Jun. Soc'Y 177 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Frankel-Fed-
eral and State].
In view of the events transpiring in California, former Chief Justice Gibson of the
California Supreme Court, along with able members of the bench, the bar, and the legis-
lature, renewed an already determined effort to provide more functional means to re-
move unfit judges. The goal was to relieve both the legislature and the public of their
cumbersome responsibility by substituting independent executive machinery that could
make quick and efficient investigations and recommendations with respect to the contin-
uing abilities of any judge in the state whose capacities had been properly challenged.
33. The fruit of the labors of Chief Justice Gibson and his fellow workers resulted in
a proposed amendment to article VI of the California Constitution, which read as
follows:
PROPOSED AMENDMENT REGARDING CREATION OF COMMISSION ON
JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS:
ARTICLE VI
SECTION lb. There shall be a Commission on Judicial Qualifications. It shall
consist of: (i) Two justices of district courts of appeal, two judges of superior
courts, and one judge of a municipal court, each selected by the Supreme Court for
a four-year term; (ii) two members of the State Bar, who shall have practiced law
in this State for at least 10 years and who shall be appointed by the Board of Gov-
ernors of the State Bar for a four-year term; and (iii) two citizens, neither of whom
shall be a justice or judge of any court, active or retired, nor a member of the State
Bar, and who shall be appointed by the Governor for a four-year term. Every ap-
pointment made by the Governor to the commission shall be subject to the advice
and consent of a majority of members elected to the Senate, except that if a vacancy
occurs when the Legislature is not in session, the Governor may issue an interim
commission which shall expire on the last day of the next regular or special session
of the Legislature. Whenever a member selected under subdivision (i) ceases to
be a member of the commission or a justice or judge of the court from which he
was selected, his membership shall forthwith terminate and the Supreme Court shall
select a successor for a four-year term; and whenever a member appointed under
subdivision (ii) ceases to be a member of the commission or of the State Bar, his
membership shall forthwith terminate and the Board of Governors of the State Bar
shall appoint a successor for a four-year term; and whenever a member appointed
under subdivision (iii) ceases to be a member of the commission or becomes a jus-
tice or a judge of any court or a member of the State Bar, his membership shall
forthwith terminate and the Governor shall appoint a successor for a four-year
term. No member of the commission shall receive any compensation for his serv-
ices as such, but shall be allowed his necessary expenses for travel, board and lodg-
ing incurred in the performance of his duties as such.
No act of the commission shall be valid unless concurred in by a majority of its
members. The commission shall select one of its members to serve as chairman.
SECTION 10b. A justice or judge of any court of this State, in accordance with
the procedure prescribed in this section, may be removed for willful misconduct in
office or willful and persistent failure to perform his duties or habitual intemper-
ance, or he may be retired for disability seriously interfering with the performance
of his duties, which is, or is likely to become, of a permanent character. The Com-
mission on Judicial Qualifications may, after such investigation as the commission
deems necessary, order a hearing to be held before it concerning the removal or
retirement of a justice or a judge, or the commission may in its discretion request
the Supreme Court to appoint three special masters, who shall be justices or judges
of courts of record, to hear and take evidence in any such matter, and to report
thereon to the commission. If, after hearing, or after considering the record and
report of the masters, the commission finds good cause therefor, it shall recommend
to the Supreme Court the removal or retirement, as the case may be, of the justice
or judge.
The Supreme Court shall review the, ecord of the proceedings on the law and
facts and in its discretion may permit the introduction of additional evidence and
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D. The Commission 4
The Commission on Judicial Qualifications' 5 is composed of nine
shall order removal or retirement, as it finds just and proper, or wholly reject the
recommendation. Upon an order for retirement, the justice or judge shall thereby
be retired with the same rights and privileges as if he retired pursuant to statute.
Upon an order for removal, the justice or judge shall thereby be removed from of-
f ice, and his salary shall cease from the date of such order.
All papers filed with and proceedings before the Commission on Judicial Qualifi-
cations or masters appointed by the Supreme Court, pursuant to this section, shall
be confidential, and the filing of papers with and the giving of testimony before
the commission or the masters shall be privileged; but no other publication of such
papers or proceedings shall be privileged in any action for defamation except that
(a) the record filed by the commission in the Supreme Court continues privileged
and upon such filing loses its confidential character and (b) a writing which was
privileged prior to its filing with the commission or the masters does not lose such
privilege by such filing. The Judicial Council shall by rule provide for procedure
under this section before the Commission on Judicial Qualifications, the masters,
and the Supreme Court. A justice or judge who is a member of the commission
or Supreme Court shall not participate in any proceedings involving his own re-
moval or retirement.
This section is alternative to, and cumulative with, the methods of removal of
justices and judges provided in Sections 10 and 10a of this article, Sections 17 and
18 of Article IV, and Article XXIII, of this Constitution.
The proposed constitutional amendment appeared as Proposition 10 on the November
8, 1960 ballot. It had been given much publicity and was adopted by a three-to-one
vote of the people. (For an opinion voicing opposition to such a plan, see Walker, De-
sirability of Proposals for Disciplining Judges, 32 L.A.B. BULL. 73 (1957). But see
Frankel, Judicial Discipline and Removal, 44 Thx. L. Rav. 117 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Frankel-Discipline]; Frankel-Removal, supra note 32, at 169-70; Remedies, supra
note 32, at 167-74).
In 1961 implementing legislation was enacted, Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 564, at 1682-
85, and pursuant thereto the California Judicial Council promulgated appropriate pro-
cedural regulations governing the Commission's activities. Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 564;
CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 68701-55 (West 1961); CAL. R. Or. 901-19 (effective August
1, 1961).
34. The Commission's day to day operations have been extensively treated elsewhere
and will only be sketched herein. See generally REPORTS OF THE COMMISSION ON JUtD-
CIAL QUALiFCATIONS (1961-1975) [hereinafter cited as COMM'N REPORT]; W. BRArrl-
wArrE, WHO CAN BEST JUDGE THE JUDGES? 89-95 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BRArrH-
wArrE-JuDGES]; Bray, Judging Judges-The California Commission on Judicial Qualifi-
cations, 33 NEv. ST. B. 1. 28 (1968); Buckley, The Commission on Judicial Qualifica-
tions: An Attempt to Deal with Judicial Misconduct, 3 U.S.F.L. REv. 244 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Buckley] (This article has some unusual aspects because it is writ-
ten from the point of view of a Los Angeles Deputy Public Defender); Burke, supra
note 16, at 168-72; Frankel-Removal, supra note 32, at 168-71; Frankel-Federal and
State, supra note 32, at 181-82; Frankel-Discipline, supra note 33, at 1128-32;
Frankel-Measures, supra note 32, at 220-22; Frankel, What's in a Name?--California
Sets the Style, 41 L.A.B. BULL. 189 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Frankel-Name];
Frankel, Judicial Ethics and Discipline for the 1970s, 54 JUD. 18 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Frankel-Ethics]; Healy, Judicial (Dis)qualifications, 4 TR. JunDGs J. 3, 18
(1965) (this article, written by a judge, contains an amusing parody on judicial mis-
conduct); Remedies, supra note 32, at 175-84; Traynor, Rising Standards of Courts and
Judges, 40 CAL. ST. B.J. 677, 687-88 (1965); Traynor, Who Can Best Judge the Judges?
42 CAL. ST. B.J. 225, 238-39 (1967).
35, The former nme is actually a misnomer because the Commission has never had
1976]
204 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
members and an executive secretary.3 6 Five of the members are
judges selected and appointed from various levels of the state judiciary
by the California Supreme Court.37  Of the remaining four members,
two are experienced attorneys chosen by the Board of Governors of the
California State Bar Association, 38 and the other two members are lay
persons appointed by the Governor of California upon the approval of
the State Senate.3" The Commission maintains a permanent office in
San Francisco which is staffed by the Executive Secretary and a steno-
grapher.40 Although Commission related expenses are met by the State,
none of the members receives a salary.
41
The principal task of the Commission is to receive, consider, and
investigate complaints lodged against judges. Where necessary, the
Commission may institute formal proceedings and recommend appro-
anything to do with qualifying judges for office. On the contrary, its sole concern has
been with the sanction and removal of those judges already on the bench who are unfit,
disabled, or in need of discipline. The Commission's new name was conferred by the
California electorate on November 2, 1976, when it adopted Proposition 7 on the
General Ballot. See CAL. AssEM. CONsT. AM. 96 (1976) (hereinafter cited as ACA
96). For a summary of the important changes embodied in ACA 96, see text accom-
panying notes 157-63 infra. COMM'N REPORT (1968) supra note 34.
36. To assure geographic equality of representation, members of the Commission are
selected from all parts of the State. For example, the composition as of Jan. 1976 in-
cluded residents of Sacramento, San Francisco, Napa, Los Angeles, Bakersfield, and San
Mateo. COMM'N REPORT (1975), supra note 34.
37. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 8 (West Supp. 1975). Two of the judges are selected from
the court of appeal, two from the superior court, and one from the municipal court.
Neither this provision nor those mentioned in the text accompanying notes 38 & 39
infra were affected by ACA 96.
38. Id. It is required that the appointed attorneys have had at least 10 years experi-
ence practicing law in California before they are eligible.
39. The decision to include laymen caused some initial controversy because it was felt
that, being unknowledgeable in this area, they would judge the judges too harshly. As
a matter of experience, the lay members of the Commission have been a valued asset.
Burke, supra note 17, at 172. All members' terms are 4 years, but if a member's quali-
fying basis ceases to exist, his membership likewise terminates. CAL. CONSr., art. 6,
§ 8 (West Supp. 1975).
40. The office is located at: 3041 State Building, 350 McAllister Street, San Fran-
cisco, California 94102.
41. CAL. GOVT. CoDz ANN. § 68703 (West 1966). Although the specific language
relating to non-payment of salaries to Commission members was deleted from section
68703 in subsequent amendments, the policy of non-payment remains unchanged. One
of the objections to creating a Commission was that it would soon develop into an ex-
pensive bureaucracy, but experience has shown this not to be the case. During its first
nine years, the average annual budget of the Commission was approximately $40,000.
This figure included the salary of both the Executive Secretary and the staff stenogra-
pher. Frankel-Ethics, supra note 34, at 18,
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priate disciplinary measures. 42 The final decision, however, as to
whether sanctions should be imposed is presently left to the California
Supreme Court.
Complaints are accepted from all sources-including members of the
public, state and local officials, attorneys, and from judges themselves.
43
Upon receipt of a complaint, the Executive Secretary performs an
initial screening. Those complaints which are insubstantial on their
faces or which deal with subject matter not within the Commission's
jurisdiction are eliminated at once.44 The file is closed and an explana-
tory notice is sent to the complainant. Approximately 70% of the
complaints received during the years 1961 through 1974 were disposed
of in this manner.45 Where a complaint appears to have prima facie
validity, the Executive Secretary will commence an informal, but highly
confidential series of inquiries to determine the exact depth and sub-
stance of the charges. 46  Usually, this consists of contacting persons
42. COMM'N REPORT (1969), supra note 34, at 1.
43. The proper format is to submit a statement of charges to the Executive Secretary.
Although written, signed complaints are preferred, the Commission will not disregard
telephone complaints or those which are made anonymously, as long as the latter con-
tain allegations of specific misconduct. Buckley, supra note 34, at 253. While the
greatest number of complaints is received from the public, those with the most substan-
tive merit come from members of the bench and bar. COMM'N REPORT (1961-1975),
supra note 34, passim; Buckley, supra note 34, at 253 n.12. It is interesting that many
of the frivolous complaints lodged by members of the public arise "in connection with
traffic and small claims courts, forums in which the citizen litigates without an attor-
ney," COMM'N REPORT (1969), supra note 34, at 3. See Remedies, supra note 32, at
178.
44. COMM'N REPORT (1964), supra note 34, at 1; The 1970 Commission Report
stated:
The Commission has no power to review claims of judicial error or mistake, which
may be the subject of appeal, nor can it supervise local court administration, nor
evaluate the legal learning or judicial ability of judges, nor monitor judicial perform-
ance. Nonetheless, all these issues are put to the Commission from time to time,
as well as complaints based solely upon litigants' disagreement with rulings or their
feelings of dislike for a particular judge.
COMM'N REPORT (1970), supra note 34, at 2. While complaints of this type are dis-
missed out of hand, there is a beneficial effect nevertheless. The public is reassured
that there is someone there to hear and look into their complaints. This in itself relieves
much of the discontent. COMM'N REPORT (1963), supra note 34, at 3; Burke, supra
note 17, at 171.
45. COMM'N REPORT (1961-75) supra note 34, passim. During the 15 years of the
Commission's existence approximately 2,200 complaints have been lodged against judges.
Of these, nearly 1,600 have been summarily dismissed as unpursuable. Id.
46. CAL. R. Cr. 902. This rule requires that strictest confidence be maintained in
all proceedings until a formal disciplining recommendation by the Commission has been
filed with the supreme court. It is unanimously agreed that extreme confidentiality in
the Commission's work is absolutely essential. "Mhe success that the Commission has
had . . would not have been possible without the constitutional requirement of confi-
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"close" to the judge who would be best able to verify or dispel the truth
of the accusations. At this early stage the judge would not be ques-
tioned, nor would he know that his associates had been contacted. 7
Where the informal inquiries indicate that no real problem exists,
the file is closed. If, on the other hand, the inquiries result in uncover-
ing facts which tend to support the charges, the matter will be brought
to the Commission's attention at its next regularly scheduled meeting.4"
At this juncture, the Commission may decide to proceed along any of
several courses, depending on the nature and extent of the infraction
and the attitude and cooperation of the judge.49
dentiality. The commission's rigorous adherence to this fundamental . . .has been a
substantial factor in carrying forward a constructive program of discipline." COMM'N
REPORT (1965), supra note 34, at 2; see also Burke, supra note 16, at 172. While con-
fidentiality is no longer a constitutional mandate, it is still provided for in the Rules
of Court. CAL. R. Cr. 902. Confidentiality has a twofold purpose: It "protects the
reputation of judges against irresponsible accusations and shields complainants from re-
prisals at the hands of the judge." Frankel-Ethics, supra note 34, at 18, 19. To fur-
ther protect complainants and thereby encourage people to come forward, the Commis-
sion acts on its own initiative once it has received impetus from an outside source. Buck-
ley, supra note 34, at 256. In fact, it is said that in the initial stages, confidentiality
is so strictly maintained that, in most instances, unless the judge himself divulges he is
under investigation, no one other than those questioned will know of the proceedings,
Remedies, supra note 32, at 180. See also Buckley, supra note 34, at 255-56. This
certainly, however, did not prove to be the case when Judge James McCartney was under
investigation in 1973. Shortly after the Formal Notice of Hearing was filed a newspa-
per article appeared detailing almost every charge. It was openly agreed by all parties
that the proceedings were widely known to the public. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUAL-
IFICATIONS: INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE-No. 13, Prehearing Proceedings 18, 19
(Oct. 27, 1972).
47. Remedies, supra note 32, at 180.
48. Where necessary, of course, an emergency meeting can be called. In addition,
the Executive Secretary is in close contact with the Chairman between meetings so that
any situation needing immediate attention can be dealt with at once. See generally
Remedies, supra note 32, at 180.
49. Although the Commission is empowered at this point to undertake a full investi-
gation, the practice has usually been to proceed in stages. If the offense is a minor
one and has been apparently established, the Executive Secretary might send an informal
"Staff Letter" to the judge bringing his attention to the fact that allegations have been
made against him and that the matter has been taken under advisement by the Commis-
sion; the judge is invited to give an explanatory reply.
If the charges are more serious and the initial inquiries appear conclusive, the Execu-
five Secretary might be authorized to send a "Staff Inquiry Letter" to the judge. The
alleged charges would be mentioned therein. A.F. Bray, former Chairman of the Com-
mission, noted in this regard:
[In quite a number of instances, ... complaints disclose situations, which, while
not serious enough to warrant the removal of the judge . . . nevertheless disclose
practices indicating that the particular judge has a poor idea or none at all, of public
relations or the proper relationship between judge and counsel, or judge and witness,
or party; or they may indicate a lack of knowledge of the Code of Judicial Ethics
of the American Bar Association and the Conference of California Judges, of such
matters, for example, as continued failure to start Court on time, taking unlimited
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If the matter is a serious one involving some kind of criminal conduct
or other intolerable behavior, a full-scale preliminary investigation will
be launched at once.50 The judge involved will be notified through
a formal letter from the Commission of the charges being investigated
and of his rights under the law, 51 one of which is that he be provided
an opportunity to present evidence on his own behalf.52 Upon con-
recesses, constant wisecracking in court, short court hours, etc. In these instances
we notify the judge of the charge and tactfully suggest that if the practice com-
plained of exists, it be discontinued.
Quoted in Burke, supra note 17, at 171; see COMM'N REPORT (1966), supra note 34,
at 3. In instances such as these, a reply from the judge is requested. Oftentimes, the
explanatory reply offered by the judge will satisfy the Commission that no further action
need be taken and the file is closed. Occasionally the file might be kept open for a
subsequent check and then closed. Frankel-Measures, supra note 32, at 221. The
strongest approach is for the Commission to send a formal "Letter of Inquiry" to the
judge. This letter delineates in concise language the specific charges and the alleged facts
upon which they are founded. It also sets out the Commission's constitutional and statu-
tory authority and informs the judge of his rights under the law. While this ominous pro-
cedure is generally reserved for those instances where a full preliminary investigation
is to be undertaken (see notes 50-53 infra and accompanying text), it is sometimes used
when the Commission feels that the judge needs a good shaking-up to get him back on
the right course of conduct. It is well established the above-described "Letter Procedure"
has been one of the most efficacious informal tools in the Commission's arsenal. As
noted, in most situations the misconduct of the judge is simply not of the kind or degree
that justifies the time and expense of a major proceeding: A simple letter, however, lets
the judge know very definitely that his behavior is under scrutiny by the Commission.
If the judge was aware of his wrong-doings, he will now be likely to curb them. If he
was unaware of his behavior patterns, the letter will serve to awaken him so that he
may make the necessary adjustments. In the case of disability, the judge might be led
for the first time to consider retiring. Where there have been mental failings, the "Letter
Procedure" has been especially helpful because an incapacitated judge will rarely be
aware of his shortcomings. Under certain circumstances the Commission might decide
to approach the Judge personally and suggest his retirement. CoMM'N REPORT (1961-
1974) supra note 34, passim; Frankel-Discipline, supra note 33, at 1132; Remedies,
supra note 32, at 175-84; Burke, supra note 17, at 171.
50. CAL. R. Cr. 904(b). It is at this point, wishing to avoid publicity or possible
humiliation, that most judges will retire or resign. In fact, since 1961 approximately
60 judges have been induced to leave the bench. The Commission Reports have made
it very clear that the majority of the terminations have been caused by disability rather
than misconduct. Certainly this process of forced natural selection is necessary if a vital
judiciary is to be maintained. The prospect of retirement is also made more attractive
by the generous retirement pensions available to California judges. All retirements ef-
fected this way and even those ordered by the Court are considered voluntary. CAL.
CONST. art. 6, § 18(d).
51. CAL. R. CT. 904(b). Pursuant to statutory authority, the Commission may em-
ploy any person that is needed to assist it in carrying out its investigations. CAL. GOV'T.
CODE ANN. § 68702 (West Supp. 1975). In addition, the legislature has provided that
all state and local agencies and officers and employees thereof give any reasonable as-
sistance to the Commission that is needed. Commission Reports indicate that such as-
sistance has been invaluable to its success. See, e.g., COMM'N REPORT (1964), supra
note 34, at 3.
52. CAL. R. Cr. 904. Following the decision in McCartney v. Commission on Judi-
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clusion of the preliminary investigation, the Commission must deter-
mine whether a formal administrative hearing should be instituted."8
When such a hearing is deemed necessary, 54 the Commission may
choose to hear the matter itself, or it may petition the supreme court
to appoint special masters to conduct the proceedings. 5 Although a
Deputy Attorney General will usually serve as examiner and present
evidence against the judge, the Commission may employ special outside
counsel for this purpose if it so desires."6
Upon submission of all of the evidence, the special masters are
required to make and report findings of fact and conclusions of law;
they may also make recommendations as to what disposition should be
made of the matter.57  If a timely appeal objecting to the masters'
cial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512, 520 P.2d 268, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1974), the impact
of this rule was considerably weakened. See notes 81-94 infra and accompanying text.
53. CAL. R. Cr. 905(a).
54. Id., Rule 905(b). This rule requires that formal notice be sent to the judge. The
notice must include a concise statement of the charges and the alleged facts upon which
they are based. Pursuant to Rule 906, the judge is given fifteen days to answer the
charges. No demurrers or other pleadings are permitted. Rule 910 provides that a full
panoply of procedural rights be given to the judge.
55. Special masters are appointed from among judges of courts of record. CAL. R.
Or. 904. While the usual number of special masters is three, where the judge under
examination agrees, the number may be lowered to one. id. The use of the special
masters has been regular and seems preferable in that it helps guarantee that the accused
will be examined before a well-trained yet completely uninformed and therefore unbiased
panel. This ensures a "fair trial." The Commission may require attendance of wit-
nesses and may exercise its subpoena power by petitioning the Superior Court. CAL.
Gov'T. CODE ANN. §§ 68725-26, 68750-53 (West 1964). Interestingly, the Commission
has not been given the power to compel a judge to submit to a medical examination.
As noted below, however, failure of a judge to comply with the Commission's request
may be considered against him.
56. CAL. GovT. CODE ANN. § 68702 (West Supp. 1975).
57. CAL. R. Cr. 912. Recently, hoivever,
[a]t the request of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications, the Judicial Coun-
cil tentatively approved the deletion from the rules of a provision that masters
appointed to conduct a hearing on the removal, censure or retirement of a
judge may include in their report to the commission a recommendation for cen-
sure, removal or retirement, or for dismissal of the proceedings. The Council is
of the view that this provision may be unnecessary and that it may distract from
the essential fact-finding duty of the masters and may potentially impinge on the
constitutional authority of the commission.
Judicial Counsel Proposes New Rules: Asks Attorneys' Comments, 51 CAL. ST. BAR
J. 54, 55, 56 (1976). See note 113 infra and accompanying text. Under Rule 908,
the hearing will proceed whether or not the judge files a formal answer to the charges.
The failure of the judge to answer or appear, however, cannot by itself be taken as
evidence to the truth of the charges. On the other hand, the failure of the judge
to take the stand on his own behalf or to submit to a medical examination may be
considered, unless the failure was for a reason beyond his control. CAL. R. CT. 812.
Under Rule 909, only legal evidence is admissible. Pursuant to Rule 911, the charges
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findings and conclusions is filed, 58 the Commission will review all the
evidence and transcripts and then hear oral argument from both sides
before making its own findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recom-
mendation to the supreme court.59 If the Commission's recommenda-
tion is objected to, a petition seeking its modification or rejection may
be filed with the supreme court. In that event, another hearing will
be held after which a final determination on the issue is made. 60
Ill. THE COMMISSION AND THE COURT
A. Overview
This section deals mainly with the evolution of the Commission in
terms of decisional law developed by the California Supreme Court.
The consideration of the cases will be divided into an analysis of the
major procedural and substantive issues that have arisen as a result
of the Commission's activities. In order that later developments in this
area might be solidly founded, a particular effort is made to note poten-
tial weaknesses that can, and should, be remedied at this early stage.
But first, it is necessary to present a brief summary of the Commission's
experiences during the years from 1961 through August, 1970 when,
with 'one noteworthy exception, the court remained completely in the
background.
B. 1961-1970
Pursuant to the original constitutional provision, the Commission was
empowered to recommend discipline only when a judge's behavior
could be characterized as "wilful misconduct in office or wilfull and per-
sistent failure to perform his judicial duties or habitual intemperance;"
and only when the misconduct was of such severity to justify the judge's
removal. 61 As a result of this fairly limited basis for discipline, the
Commission's primary area of effectiveness in its early years was in
securing the retirement of disabled judges.62 In fact, through the first
against the judge may be amended at any time to conform to the proof or to set forth
additional facts. Although in such instances, the judge is permitted to amend his answer
and to prepare new defenses, the constitutionality of the rnle has been questioned. See
notes 101-112 infra and accompanying text.
58. CAL. R. CT. 914. The Commission is also empowered, under Rule 916, to remand
for further findings by the masters where the case was originally heard before them.
59. Id., Rule 917.
60. Id., Rule 920.
61. CAL. CONsT. art. 6 (former § 10b) (repealed, Nov. 8, 1966). See note 34 supra.
62. Former section 10b also provided that a judge may be "retired for disability seri-
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three years of its existence, no recommendations of discipline were
made. 3 In 1964, the Commission did seek to have Charles F. Stevens,
an Oceanside Municipal Court Judge, removed. Following a one week
formal hearing, the Commission found that Judge Stevens had willfully
misconducted himself. Evidence clearly demonstrated that he had
shown extreme bias against the prosecution in many criminal cases, as
well as having committed other ethically questionable acts such as dis-
missing a criminal case in which he had formerly appeared as the
defendant's attorney, and allowing attorneys to appear in his courtroom
who owed him money and were representing him in another lawsuit.
64
In a three sentence opinion, the California Supreme Court stated that it
found no basis in the record to support the Commission's recommenda-
tion and dismissed the proceeding. 65
There was conjecture at this time that the supreme court must have
found Judge Stevens' behavior reprehensible, but it was of the opinion
that his offenses did not warrant the extreme sanction of removal and,
finding itself powerless under the constitution to impose any lesser dis-
cipline, the court dismissed the action. 66  In the wake of Stevens and
five years of practical experience (which clearly showed that most mis-
conduct among judges was not of a removal magnitude) the Commis-
sion noted in its 1965 Report to the Governor that "certain weaknesses
and uncertainties" in the constitutional language had come to light.
0 7
Accordingly, it urged support of the proposed revisions then being
drafted by the legislature's Constitutional Revision Commission.
Two of the proposals were of paramount importance. First, it was
ously interfering with the performance of his duties, which is, or is likely to become,
of a permanent character." Id. From 1961 through 1966, the Commission was respon-
sible for inducing 39 retirements or resignations. COMM'N REPORT (1961-1966), supra
note 34, passim.
63. COMM'N REPORT (1961-63), supra note 34, passim.
64. BRArrHWArEr-JDGES, supra note 34, at 90.
65. Stevens v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 61 Cal. 2d 886, 393 P.2d 709,
39 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1964). All of the California opinions in this area have been per
curiam. Compare with In re Deiner, 304 A.2d 587 (Md. Ct. App. 1973). It seems
the California Supreme Court may have also adopted a per curiam approach at the
hearing level, as well. For example, at the June 15, 1975 hearing before the court in
Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 14 Cal. 3d 678, 537 P.2d 898, 122
Cal. Rptr. 778 (1975) (which this author attended) Chief Justice Wright was the only
member of the court to make any comments. It appeared that the other justices had
deferred to him. In Stevens, the formal hearing was conducted personally by the mem-
bers of the Commission, not by special masters. CoMM'N REPORT (1964), supra note
34, at 1.
66. Frankel-Discipline, supra note 33, at 1129.
67. COMM'N REPORT (1965), supra note 34, at 3.
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recommended that "'conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
bringing the judicial office into disrepute'" be added to the list of
offenses subject to discipline."8 It was felt that this new category would
serve as something of a catch-all for the milder yet plainly objectionable
and more prevalent judicial transgressions. Second, it was believed that
"public censure" should be provided as an additional sanction. 69 From
the Stevens "decision" it had become apparent that the supreme court
was not going to exercise its removal authority lightly. Thus, the addi-
tion of the public censure power was absolutely essential if the Commis-
sion was to be at all effective in the area of discipline, as opposed to
disability. The above-noted major changes, along with several minor
ones,70 were put to the electorate in the form of a constitutional amend-
ment in November, 1966. The amendment was passed effective on




69. Id. at 3-4.
70. The minor changes included: (1) making an offense committed "in office" in-
clude any offense "occurring not more than six years prior to the commencement..."
of the judge's current term; (2) making a judge who has been removed from office there-
after ineligible for judicial office; (3) to provide that when a judge faces serious criminal
charges or when a removal recommendation is pending before the supreme court, the
judge will be disqualified from office but without loss of salary during the pendency.
CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 18. Presently, when a recommendation for his retirement is pend-
ing before the court, a judge will be disqualified. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 18(a).
71. Frankel, Judicial Accountability-Unfitness, Transgression, and the Misfit: The
State of Art in California, 4 L.A.B. BULL. 411, 412 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Frankel
-Accountability]. As before, the Commission continued to induce the voluntary retire-
ment of disabled judges, and from 1967 through 1974, the Commission induced the res-
ignations or retirements of more than 20 judges. COMM'N REPORT (1967-74), supra
note 34, passim. Three more years passed and no disciplinary proceedings were insti-
tuted. After its "setback" in Stevens, the Commission may have felt reluctant to make
another recommendation on any but the most overwhelming grounds. Then in 1970,
a superior court judge of Santa Clara County was publicly censured by the supreme court
on the Commission's recommendation. In re Chargin, 2 Cal. 3d 617, 471 P.2d 29, 87
Cal. Rptr. 709 (1970). (The formal hearing in Chargin was conducted by special mas-
ters, as have been all others since). The formal hearing produced incontrovertible evi-
dence that the judge had directed a searing, racist diatribe at one of the defendants in
his courtroom. This was the first application of the new sanction. See BarnwArrE-
JuDGEs, supra note 34, at 92, 93. In 1971 a San Francisco judge was publicly censured
for having "become uncontrollably angry and chastised a victim in a rape case in a
wholly unacceptable manner." In re Glickfield, 3 Cal. 3d 891, 479 P.2d 638, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 278 (1971); see Frankel-Accountability, supra note 34, at 413. These cases both
involved single instances of open court misconduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. The fact that the behavior in both
cases occurred only in single instances and was only "prejudicial conduct," as opposed to
"willful misconduct," indicated that the public censure was the appropriate sanction.
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C. 1970-Present
The October 1973 decision in Geiler v. Commission on Judicial
Qualifications2 marked the first in-depth analysis of the California
Supreme Court in the area of judicial discipline. Although there were
five earlier opinions by the court (four of which meted out sanctions),
none of them exceeded a short paragraph, nor did any of them involve
the removal of a judge.73  Since Geiler, there have been three deci-
sions by the court: McCartney v. Commision on Judicial Qualifica-
tions;74 Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications;" and, most
recently, Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications .7  Two of
these opinions, McCartney and Spruance, must be regarded as signifi-
cant (which is not to say clear and consistent) developmental works,
while the other, Cannon, needed little more than a recitation of the
facts in order to reach the conclusion that removal was warranted. It
is the more salient issues in these four cases that will now be addressed.
IV. PROCEDURAL IssuEs
Inasmuch as Geiler77 was the seminal case in the area of California
judicial discipline, it was necessary for the court to establish broad and
fundamental procedural guidelines upon which later proceedings would
be structured. With respect to the burden of proof, the court analo-
Two years later, in August of 1973, a pair of Los Angeles Superior Court judges were
severely censured for having supplied blank, presigned orders to certain bail bondsmen
for release of prisoners on bail, the amount of the bonds to be fixed at the bailbonds-
man's discretion. In re Sanchez, 9 Cal. 3d 844, 512 P.2d 302, 109 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1973);
In re Chavez, 9 Cal. 3d 846, 512 P.2d 304, 109 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1973). These acts were
in flagrant contravention of court rules and were found to have constituted a course of
"willful misconduct." Yet, since there was no evidence of either judge having received
any "kick-backs" or the like, removal was deemed inappropriate.
If there had been any question as to the necessity and appropriateness of public cen-
sure as a sanction, it certainly proved itself functionally indispensable in these four situa-
tions, none of which required removal but all of which demanded discipline.
72. 10 Cal. 3d 270, 515 P.2d 1, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973).
73. In re Chavez, 9 Cal. 3d 846, 512 P.2d 303, 109 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1973); In re San-
chez, 9 Cal. 3d 844, 512 P.2d 302, 109 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1973); In re Glickfield, 3 Cal.
3d 891, 479 P.2d 638, 92 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1971); In re Chargin, 2 Cal. 3d 617, 471
P.2d 29, 87 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1970); Stevens v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications,
61 Cal. 2d 886, 393 P.2d 709, 39 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1964). For a brief discussion on
the former four cases, see note 71 supra. The Stevens case is discussed in the text ac-
companying note 65 supra.
74. 12 Cal. 3d 512, 526 P.2d 268, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1974).
75. 13 Cal. 3d 778, 532 P.2d 1209, 119 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1975).
76. 14 Cal. 3d 678, 537 P.2d 898, 122 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1975).
77. 10 Cal. 3d 270, 515 P.2d 1, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973).
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gized judicial disciplinary proceedings to those involving members of
the Bar. Accordingly, it was declared "[tihe standard of proof in...
an inquiry before the Commission [is] to be proof by clear and
convincing evidence sufficient to sustain a charge to a reasonable cer-
tainty."78 Also stressed were the points that "[tihe commission, not the
masters, is invested by the constitution with the ultimate power to rec-
ommend. . . the [discipline] of a judge, ' 79 and in coming to its recom-
mendation, the Commission may disregard the masters' findings and
make independent findings of fact and conclusions of law." It was held
proper, however, for the Commission in its discretion to give consider-
able weight to the opinion of the special masters. They heard the
testimony firsthand and were conceivably in a better position to evaluate
it."' Similarly, -the court announced that it, too, would make independent
findings of fact. From these findings, it would draw conclusions of law
and make the final determination of whether to dismiss the proceed-
ing or order the judge disciplined.82
Regarding the overall standard of behavior to which California
judges would be required to conform, the court stated:
The ultimate standard for judicial conduct must be conduct which con-
stantly reaffirms fitness for the high responsibilities of the office. 83
Whereas the procedural rulings in Geiler were of a general nature,
those raised in McCartney84 focused upon very specific and interesting
points of law.
A. Rule 904(b)
Except as to one charge, the Commission during the McCartney
investigation had failed to comply with Rule 904(b) of the California
Rules of Court which essentially requires that the Commission shall
notify the judge as to the nature of each charge against him whenever a
full preliminary hearing is to be undertaken. Presumably Rule 904(b)
was designed to provide the judge with an opportunity to present matter
78. Id. at 275, 515 P.2d at 4, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 275-76, 515 P.2d at 4, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 204. The validity of this holding
was questioned in McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal.
3d 512, 540, 526 P.2d 268, 288, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 279 (1974), where the court seemed
to rely more on the recommendation of the special masters than on its own opinion.
See note 140 infra.
81. 10 Cal. 3d 270, 275-76, 515 P.2d 1, 4, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204 (1973).
82. Id. at 275-76, 515 P.2d at 4, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
83. Id. at 281, 515 P.2d at 8, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
84. 12 Cal. 3d 512, 520 P.2d 268, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1974).
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on his own behalf from the earliest stages of the proceedings.",
McCartney claimed a denial of due process because of the Commis-
sion's failure to notify him under Rule 904(b), and asserted that the
whole proceeding was therefore invalid. 6 The court rejected this con-
tention, pointing out that the requirement of Rule 904(b) goes beyond
any constitutional mandates of the due process clause. Thus, it was held
that in the absence of a showing of "actual prejudice," there could be no
violation of a judge's rights. This was especially so under the facts of
McCartney, because once the Commission decided to go ahead with
a formal hearing, the judge was given notice as to every general and
specific charge against him and had three full months to prepare his
defenses.
87
Judge McCartney's second and far more compelling Rule 904(b)
argument was that since the great majority of the evidence obtained
through the preliminary investigation was one-sided and since he had
not been able to defend himself at that stage, he could not possibly
have received a fair and impartial hearing.8 s The reason for this was
obvious: It would be the very same members of the Commission
who heard the uncontested, unopposed, and highly prejudicial prelimi-
nary evidence (much of which was hearsay and inadmissible at the
formal hearing) that would eventually be called upon to make or with-
hold a disciplinary recommendation. Judge McCartney was under-
standably concerned with the Commission's ability to subsequently
make an unbiased determination regarding his situation.
The court found this argument unpersuasive as well. Making refer-
ence to the Federal Trade Commission, it noted the common practice
of administrative bodies to perform both investigative and adjudicative
functions in the same matter. These two functions, the court stated,
were clearly separate and in no way mutually exclusive. 89 Moreover,
while the Commission was technically conducting the investigation, it
was the special investigators of the Attorney General who were actually
85. It is also possible that sufficient evidence presented by the judge at this stage
might obviate the need for further investigation and a formal hearing.
86. Petitioner's Brief at 14-18, McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications,
12 Cal. 3d 512, 526 P.2d 268, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Pet'n
Br., McCartney].
87. 12 Cal. 3d at 519, 526 P.2d at 273, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
88. Pet'n Br., McCartney, supra note 86, at 14-18.
89. 12 Cal. 3d at 519 n.5, 526 P.2d at 273 n.5, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 265 n.5; see, K.
DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 1310, at 237-39 (1958); Respondent's Brief at
9, McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512, 526 P.2d 268,
116 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Resp. Br., McCartney].
[Vol. 10
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
executing it. Taken together, there was no indication to the court that
the Commission's admitted "procedural irregularity" at the investigative
stage would in any way adversely affect its fairness and impartiality at
the recommendation level of the proceedings. 9
The court's supportive reasoning completely fails to meet the real
thrust of McCartney's argument; nonetheless, its holding is still justifi-
able. The fact that it is common practice for administrative agencies
to perform both administrative and adjudicative functions does not have
the slightest tendency to lessen the strong possibility of Commission
prejudice and partiality over which McCartney was worried; nor does
the fact special investigators "dig up" the evidence alleviate the prob-
lem: The Commission must still listen to the information gathered.
The perhaps unfortunate, but better rationale for rejecting the second
Rule 904(b) argument is the same as that for the first. At its present
level of evolution, constitutional due process simply does not require
a separation of functions in agencies of this kind; nor does it give to
a judge the right of representation at the investigative stage of a judi-
cial discipline proceeding. 91
The effect of the court's holding in this regard was to relegate Rule
904(b) to the status of a mere procedural nicety. Recognizing the
situation for what it is, the logical and proper thing to do would be
either to amend the rule or to eliminate it altogether. At the
very least, that portion of the rule which states "shall notify" the judge
of charges against him should be changed to "may notify" the
judge. This would clearly establish that notification is a matter of
discretion with the Commission, not obligation. 2 Such an approach is
preferable to the present language, because as the rule now stands, it
is demonstrably unenforceable. Of what use or good is a rule for the
breach of which there is no remedy? Its undesirability becomes further
90. 12 Cal. 3d at 519, 526 P.2d at 273, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 265. Apparently, the same
view is held in other jurisdictions which have considered the question in this regard. See
Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Heitzler, 291 N.E.2d 477, 482 (Ohio 1972); In re Deiner, 304
A.2d 587, 597-98 (Md. 1973); Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Resp.
Br., McCartney, supra note 89, at 10-12.
91. Cf. note 87 supra.
92. The examiners in McCartney suggested to the court that "when viewed in the con-
text of the entire process involved, the rule should be viewed as one designed primarily
for the benefit of the Commission ..... Resp. Br., McCartney, supra note 89, at 18-
19. Although it seems doubtful that such was the purpose of the rule, there is certainly
no question left'that after the holding in McCartney, such has become its effect. On
this basis, the language of the rule should be made' commensurate with the meaning
given to it.
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apparent when it is realized that, under existing law, Rule 904(b)
"4actual prejudice" could only be demonstrated where the notice of
formal hearing was defective. In that instance, failure to give proper
notice at the preliminary investigation stage would still be a non-pivotal
lesser included offense and any remedy would have to be fashioned
on the failure of the formal notice. Perhaps the better choice would
be to strike the rule entirely. This would avoid the possibility of claims
later arising that the Commission has denied equal protection by grant-
ing the notice to some while not to others.
B. Discovery
Another point of contention in McCartney centered around the
Commission's refusal to permit the judge to use certain forms of dis-
covery, viz., written interrogatories, depositions, and requests for admis-
sions. Under the Commission's established discovery procedures,
either party, with certain exceptions, is allowed to obtain any informa-
tion in the possession of the other party relating to witnesses, charges
and other relevant matters. This includes, but is not limited to, the
contents of investigative reports, reports of interviews with potential
and actual witnesses, and other relevant writings. 93 On the other hand,
there is apparently no discovery procedure whereby a judge may, on
his own, compel persons with information to divulge it. The Commis-
sion does have the power, however, to grant broader discovery
privileges, although these are not available as a matter of right.
Judge McCartney argued that because of the limitations imposed by
the Commission, he could not adequately prepare his case without
great difficulty.94 Counsel's briefs on this point were directed mainly
to a discussion of what standard of discovery, civil or criminal, should
apply,95 but the court carefully sidestepped this issue, holding that the
petitioner's requests for broader discovery were so general and vague
(lacking even a minimal showing of good cause) that it would be
impossible to find that the Commission had abused its discretion in
denying them." The argument in favor of the civil discovery standard
was that insofar as the court saw fit in Geiler to analogize judicial dis-
ciplinary proceedings to similar proceedings of the State Bar concerning
93. DISCOVERY PROCEDURE, COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS 1-2 (June,
1969); see Resp. Br., McCartney, supra note 89, App.
94. Pet'n. Br., McCartney, supra note 86, at 18-19.
95. Resp. Br., McCartney, supra note 89, at 21-27.
96. 12 Cal. 3d at 520, 526 P.2d at 273, 116 Cal. Rptr. 265.
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the burden of proof involved, there was no reason why the same
analogy should not have been made with respect to discovery privileges.
In Brotsky v. State Bar,97 it had been established that the civil standard
would apply in State Bar proceedings. The Attorney General (i.e., the
Commission) took the position that in a normal administrative setting,
there is no broad right to a civil discovery standard; similarly, there
should be none here. Moreover, it was contended that in relation to
discovery, the holding in Brotsky v. State Bar was not controlling in
McCartney. The main ground for this assertion was a factual distinc-
tion between the two cases. At the time Brotsky was decided, the State
Bar had no clearly defined rules for discovery; whereas at the time of
McCartney, the Commission already had a well established policy for
discovery that had been in effect for several years. It was also argued
that by allowing broad discovery, such as McCartney sought, the con-
fidentiality of the proceedings might be jeopardized. Finally, the
respondent said, Judge McCartney had not in fact been prejudiced by
the limited discovery and was able to glean all the information he
needed.
98
It seems that the Commission's position is without substantial merit.
The Commission, like the State Bar, is probably more sui generis than
administrative. As such, the comparison between it and other adminis-
trative agencies should not be overworked. 99 Also, those warnings
given by the Executive Secretary at the initial inquiry level, claimed
to be effective, could be equally well employed at the discovery
stage.
100
In answer to the argument that, in fact, the petitioner had not been
prejudiced because he was able to discover all the information he
97. 57 Cal. 2d 287, 368 P.2d 697, 19 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1962).
98. Resp. Br., McCartney, supra note 89, at 21-27.
99. It was openly admitted in McCartney that within days of the formal notice of
hearing, a confidential document, there wasn't a scintilla of confidentiality left to be pro-
tected. From the outset, newspapers in the San Bernardino area had been carrying in-
explicably detailed accounts of everything that was transpiring. Apparently, the same
thing, although to a lesser degree, occurred in Cannon.
100. Deputy Attorney General Kent L. Richland, an examiner in the Cannon hearing,
stated that he found the admonition of confidentiality to be generally effective in the
interviews he conducted and thus questions the validity of this argument against discov-
ery. Interview with Kent L. Richland, Deputy Attorney General of California (exam-
iner in Cannon), in Los Angeles, July 17, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Richland Inter-
view, 7/17/75. Special thanks are due Mr. Richland for his generous contribution of
time and insight. He also pointed out that there is really no remedy for a violation,
if one can be detected. In this regard, Judge Older, Presiding Master in the Cannon
case, made every witness sign a "gag-order" before testifying. Id.
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needed, this was not petitioner's complaint. Rather, 'his contention
was that the burden created by such unsatisfactory procedures made
his defense much more difficult than it fairly should have been. That
Judge McCartney was able to make adequate discovery is a reflection
on the quality of his counsel, not the fairness of the Commission's
attitude. Viewed from this standpoint, the question becomes: Is
making a judge's discovery and research job less burdensome a suffi-
cient cause for broadening the rules? In view of the expense involved
to the judge, the answer should be affirmative.
C. Rule 911
Perhaps the most significant, albeit improperly raised, objection of
Judge. McCartney concerned Rule 911.Y11 This rule provides, in
essence, that examiners may amend the accusatory pleading at any time
in a formal proceeding to conform with the proof or to add new charges
based on recently discovered information; upon any such amendment
the judge is to be given adequate time to prepare a defense.
During the course of the proceedings, due to unexpected testimony
of witnesses which revealed offenses theretofore unknown, the McCart-
ney examiners made four amendments to the charges." 2 The Com-
mission found the judge guilty of either "wilfull misconduct" or "pre-
judicial conduct" as to each of these amendments. At the time the
101. CAL. R. CT. 911.
102. Resp. Br., McCartney, supra note 89, at 13-18. The four new charges concerned
two cases in which Judge McCartney had been involved. McCartney's behavior in one
of them was already under examination by the masters and the three specific amend-
ments relating to that case merely charge additional acts of misconduct. The activity
involved in the second case was completely unknown to the examiners and the single
amendment in that regard constituted a wholly new charge. The second case was un-
usual because of the offense itself and because of the treatment given it by the court:
the defendant was a very active trial attorney in the San Bernardino area and his work
naturally required that he make numerous court appearances. In one of his cases before
Judge McCartney, a continuance had been granted. Due to an office error, the defend-
ant failed to appear on the specified day. The next time he came into Judge MeCart-
ney's court, he was found in contempt. He asked for a hearing which McCartney
granted. The matter was put on the Master Calendar. On the day of the hearing, Judge
McCartney cleared his own calendar, took off his judicial robes and proceeded to prose-
cute the attorney for contempt. The District Attorney had not been notified of the case
and was not present at the hearing. In spite of the extreme irregularity of the action
taken by McCartney, the court did not even mention it in its opinion. It has been
suggested that both the Commission, and the court were too embarrassed to discuss the
incident in any depth. Telephone interview with Robert F. Katz, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral of California and Chief Examiner in the McCartney, in Los Angeles, June 30, 1975,
[hereinafter cited as Katz Interview]. .
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amendments were introduced, Judge McCartney specifically acknowl-
edged Rule 911 and declined to challenge its validity. This was a fatal
mistake for the court ultimately refused to rule on McCartney's subse-
quently raised objection because it was deemed untimely made; never-
theless, the court conceded in dicta that "Tlhere may be some force to
[McCartney's] point that the provision for such amendment, in rule 911
bears reconsideration in light of. . . In re Ruffalo."10 3
In re Ruffalo1 4 involved an Ohio disbarment proceeding. One of
the charges alleged that Ruffalo hdd solicited FELA plaintiffs through
his part-time investigator, Michael Orlando, an employee of the Balti-
more and Ohio, Railroad Company. In attempting to refute the
charged allegation, both Ruffalo and Orlando testified that Orlando's
duties were strictly limited to investigation and did not entail solicitation
of potential plaintiffs. It also came out that in several instances
Orlando had conducted investigations for Ruffalo against the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad Co., Orlando's employer. Immediately following
this testimony, the examining board amended the pleadings to include
a charge of unethical conduct by Ruffalo in having Orlando investigate
his own employer. No additional evidence was introduced beyond the
initial inadvertent statements of Orlando and Ruffalo. 10 5
It was upon the amended charge that Ruffalo was ultimately
suspended from practicing in the federal courts of Ohio. On appeal
to the United' States Supreme Court, Justice Douglas, speaking for five
members, said:
These are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature . . . . The
charge must be known before the proceedings commence. They
become a trap when, after they are underway, the charges are amended
on the basis of testimony of the accused. He can then.be given no
opportunity to expunge the earlier statements and start afresh ...
[The argument of the examiners that due process was not denied be-
cause Ruffalo was given several months to prepare a defense to the
new charge] overlooks the fact that serious prejudice to [Ruffalo] may
well have occurred because of the content of the original... specifica-
tions of misconduct. He may well have been lulled 'into a false sense
of security.' . ... the absence of fair notice as to the reach of the ...
procedure and [as to] the precise nature of the charges deprived [him]
of procedural due process. 10 6
103. 12 Cal. 3d at 521-22, 526 P.2d at 274-75, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 266-67.
104. 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
105. Id. at 546-47.
106. rd. at 551.
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A narrow interpretation of the language and reasoning in Rufalo
suggests that an amended charge violates due process only when based
upon incriminating, inadvertent testimony of the defendant or his wit-
ness given in an attempt to exculpate the defendant from another,
known charge.107  This is where the element of trick or entrapment
lies and must be protected against. An amendment based upon infor-
mation independently discovered, however, would not be similarly
objectionable and should, therefore, be admissible. At this point, the
only issue which arises is the sufficiency of time given to the defendant
to prepare his new defenses.' 08
On the other hand, there is some support in Ruffalo for the
assertion that the strategy of the defense is and can be effectively
planned only if all the charges are presented at the outset. 09 More-
over, fundamental fairness requires that at some point there be an end
to the charges for which a person must be held to answer."' It is,
therefore, unjust to permit any kind of substantive amendment, regard-
less of the source of the information.
From a practical standpoint, however, as was shown in McCartney,
sometimes the important information simply does not come out at the
investigation stage, because tentative witnesses and interviewees are
often reluctant to speak at this point and are not compelled to do so."'
The Commission, the examiners, and most importantly, the general
public should not be deprived of a full evaluation of a judge's behavior
simply because some of the witnesses are reluctant to come forward
until coerced to do so at the last possible moment. Nor should a judge
be exonerated because the examiners, through no fault of their own,
107. This was not the situation in McCartney, where the new information came from
the examiner's witnesses. See, Javits v. Stevens, 382 F. Supp. 131, 138-39 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
108. The record in McCartney was clear that the petitioner had ample time to pre-
pare defenses to the amended charges. Resp. Br., McCartney, supra note 89, at 16-18.
109. Cf. In re Sarelas, 360 F. Supp. 794, 797 (N.D. IIl. 1973).
110. This was the only objection that Ruffalo's attorney made at the original hearing;
he contended that morally and legally the procedure was improper. It is instructive
that the due process issue upon which the court decided this case was not actually
before it, not having been raised in the briefs of counsel or in the federal proceedings
below. On the contrary, it was Ruffalo's sole contention on appeal that reasonable
men could differ as to whether the act was unethical or not, thus making disbarment
improper. 390 U.S. at 552-56 (White, J., concurring).
111. Katz Interview, supra note 102. It is suggested that this provides further support
for the view that the discovery standard in these proceedings should be the same as in
civil cases, so that potential witnesses may be compelled to disclose what they know be-
fore the hearing begins.
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were "late" in discovering the existence of an offense. To contend
otherwise is self-defeating.
It is also very much open to question whether there is a viable alter-
native to allowing such amendments. Suppose, for example, that a
very serious matter which would warrant removal, in and of itself, came
to light during the formal proceedings. Must the Commission then wait
until the present proceeding is concluded to start another one? Or
must it forgo the newly found information completely? Since it is the
public interest which is ultimately sought to be protected in this type
of proceeding, the obvious advantage of allowing amendments in all but
clearly unfair situations should be recognized. Also, the cost of having
to hold another formal hearing must be carefully considered. In
comparison to the available alternatives the more narrow reading of
Ruffalo is to be preferred." 2
D. The Open Hearing, Venue, and a Problem at Home
In addition to the issues noted above, two other significant procedural
points were raised by Judge McCartney. The first was his attack
against the requirement of a "closed hearing" under Rule 902.113
112. It seems appropriate here that the Court adopt an "actual prejudice" test similar
to the one adopted with regard to Rule 904(b). While this rule may seem harsh, there
is no doubt that the public interest being protected is great, especially because of the
enormous power that judges wield. On the other hand, although a judge might lose his
job, he is not subject to the same kind of deprivation of liberty as a criminal whose due
process had been abused. Therefore, in a questionable situation the crucial balance
should be struck more on the side of the public than on that of the judge. Richland
Interview,. 7/17/75, supra note 100. See CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 11507, 11516
(West 1966) (concerning the amendment of formal charges in hearings under the
California Administrative Procedures Act).
Several years later, Judge Noel Cannon also raised numerous "Ruffalo" objections
throughout the course of proceedings against her. Petition for Review of Findings, Con-
clusions and Recommendation of Commission on Judicial Qualifications in Inquiry Con-
cerning a Judge, No. 18, (Mar. 28, 1975), passim [hereinafter cited as, Cannon, Pet'n].
However, only one of these objections was mentioned by the court, and in spite of the
fact that Judge Cannon prevailed as to that objection its nature was such as not to call in
issue the more critical and far-reaching question raised in McCartney. In part, the Com-
mission had broadly charged petitioner with unlawful interference with the attorney-client
relationship on several occasions. Based on the evidence presented, the Commission
drew the conclusions that: (1) Judge Cannon had not only tampered with the attorney-
client relationship, as charged; but that (2) she had also interfered with the operation
of the Public Defender's Office. Since there was no basis for the second conclusion in
the charges, the Cannon court held that due process as defined in Ruffalo required that
it be stricken, despite the fact that there was ample evidence supporting it. 14 Cal. 3d
at 696, 537 P.2d at 910, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
113. CAL. R. Or. 902.
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McCartney contended that the confidentiality of the proceedings
ensured by Rule 902 was for his benefit alone and that he had the right
to waive that benefit. The court properly rejected this argument, not-
ing that "the provision for confidentiality also protects witnesses and
citizen complainants from intimidation." 114 Moreover, since the pro-
ceedings were not criminal in nature there was no constitutional
necessity of a public hearing."'
Secondly, McCartney objected to the Commission having set venue
in Pomona when the majority of the witnesses involved lived in San
Bernardino where Judge McCartney sat. The court supported the
Commission, holding that under Rule 907 the Commission had discre-
tion as to where the hearing would take place, and in the absence of
a showing of abuse, the Commission's decision would be upheld."'
A more unusual problem arose in Spruance which required the court
to determine whether the examiners had any power independently of
the Commission to present charges of a judge's misconduct. The issue
arose because there were several charges which the examiners felt had
been clearly and convincingly- proven, but which the Commission
determined were "not sustained" by the evidence. The examiners
urged that since the court undertakes an independent review of the
record, the court was free to make findings and conclusions on any
charge as to which evidence was presented, regardless of what the
Commission's disposition of the matter had been."" The court
emphatically disagreed, and stated that its power to sanction was con-
tingent upon a Commission recommendation and that "[i]t would be
entirely inconsistent. . . for us to consider in passing on the Commis-
sion's recommendation any allegations of . . . misconduct other than
those which formed the basis of that recommendation."' 1 8 It was also
pointed out that, insofar as this proceeding was concerned, the exam-
iners were counsel representing the Commission and, as such, they
couldn't urge a position which their client did not take. Similarly,
the Commission could not urge a position sub silentio through its agent,
the examiners, which it had previously specifically rejected and had
failedto raise." 9
114. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512, 521, 526
P.2d 268, 274, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 266 (1974).
115. Id. at 520-21, 526 P.2d at 274, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
116. Id. at 521, 526 P.2d at 274, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
117. Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 13 Cal. 3d 778, 784-88 n.5,





In 1973, Judge Leland W. Geiler of the Los Angeles Municipal
Court achieved the dubious distinction of becoming the first judge in
California history to be removed by order of the supreme court
pursuant to a Commission recommendation.12 ° Judge Geiler's proven
offenses, constituting both "willful misconduct" and "prejudicial con-
duct," fell into three main categories: (1) use of vulgar and obscene
language or gestures while acting in a judicial capacity; (2) committing
vulgar and obscene acts and use of improper language while engaged
in judicially related activities; and (3) committing arbitrary prejudicial
acts in the courtroom which violated the attorney-client relationship
between certain deputy public defenders and their indigent clients.121
Since the Commission had found that Judge Geiler's misdeeds
constituted both "willful misconduct in office" (willful misconduct) and
"conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judi-
cial office into disrepute" (prejudicial conduct), the court was con-
strained to define these offenses, a task which it had curiously avoided
for eight years. It was concluded at once that "willful misconduct" was
a graver offense than the lesser included "prejudicial conduct." '  The
court said "willful misconduct" should be
reserved for unjudicial conduct which a judge acting in his judicial
capacity commits in bad faith, while ... [prejudicial conduct] should
be applied to conduct which a judge undertakes in good faith which
nevertheless would appear to an objective observer to be not only
unjudicial conduct but conduct prejudicial to public esteem for the judi-
cial office. . . [Prejudicial conduct] would also apply to willful mis-
conduct out of office, i.e. unjudicial conduct committed in bad faith by
a judge not then acting in a judicial capacity. 123
120. Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 515 P.2d 1, 110
Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973).
121. Id. at 277-80 n.6, 515 P.2d at 5-6 n.6, 110 Cal. Rptr. 205-06 n.6, (setting out
the complete findings of the court as to Judge Geiler's bizarre activities).
122. Id. at 283-84, 515 P.2d at 9, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 209; see note 61 supra. The ques-
tion has been raised as to whether "prejudicial conduct" is actually a "lesser included
offense." The very definitions of "prejudicial conduct" and "willful misconduct" given
by the court (see text immediately following this footnote), suggest that these offenses
are mutually exclusive; cf. People v. Thomas, 58 Cal. 2d 121, 128, 373 P.2d 97, 100, 23
Cal. Rptr. 161, 164 (1962), Richland Interview, 7/17/75, supra note 100.
123. 10 Cal. 3d 284 & n.11, 515 P.2d at 9 & n.11, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 209 & n.l1. De-
spite its classification as a "lesser offense," this was not to be taken as meaning the court
would refuse to follow a removal recommendation based solely on "prejudicial conduct."
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A. Bad Faith
By "bad faith," the Geiler court said it meant a "pervasive course of
conduct [by a judge] of overreaching his authority over subordinates,"
or that the judge had "intentionally committed acts which he knew or
should have known were beyond his lawful power.' 1 24 Upon this basis,
the court concluded that those proven acts of Judge Geiler which
fell into categories (1) and (3), above, constituted willful misconduct,
whereas the category (2) acts constituted only prejudicial conduct. 25
In Spruance v. Commission, on Judicial Qualifications,26 the court
was again faced with a recommendation for removal based upon sub-
stantial bad faith misconduct. After a thorough review of the evidence
presented to the special masters, the court concluded that
[t]aken as a whole the record indicates that [Spruance] engaged in
a pervasive course of conduct of overreaching his judicial authority by
deciding cases for reasons other than the merits, by improperly influenc-
ing another judge, and by using the judicial process to gain special favors
for friends and political supporters. The record also shows that
' 124. Id. at 286, 515 P.2d at 11, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 211. The court was careful to point
out that it had made no difference whether the judge's abuse of power resulted in just
or unjust treatment of a particular defendant; nor did it matter that the judge had not
intentionally sought to harm the interests of any defendants. What did matter was that
the judge had used his power for personal ends. Id.
125. Id. at 284-85, 515 P.2d at 9-11, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 209-11. The court pointed
out that the standard of a judge's behavior was to be viewed objectively, not subjectively.
It was also clearly implied that all judges should know and would be held responsible
for acting in accordance with the cannons included in the ABA CODE OF JUDIcIAL EmH-
ics. 10 Cal. 3d at 281-82, 515 P.2d at 8, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 208; see, Spruance v. Com-
mission on Judicial Qualifications, 13 Cal. 3d 778, 796 & n.17, 532 P.2d 1209, 1221 &
n.17, 119 Cal. Rptr. 841, 853 & n.17 (1975). In Cannon v. Commission on Judicial
Qualifications, 14 Cal. 3d 678, 707 n.22, 537 P.2d 898, 918 n.22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 778,
798 n.22 (1975), the court noted that the CALIFORNIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT was
adopted by the Conference of California Judges effective January 1, 1975. The court
went on to state that although the Code could not be relied upon in evaluating Judge
Cahnon's behavior, which occurred prior to its adoption, that it would apply to any judi-
cial conduct occurring subsequent to its inception. Id.
' In Geiler the impression was given that while the vulgar and obscene misconduct of
Judge Geiler was certainly outlandish, it would not have resulted in removal but for the
fact that his admitted prejudice against the Public Defender's office had rendered him
incapable of administering justice in a fair and unbiased way, especially where indigents
Were concerned. Such conduct, the court said, "entailed the most insidious kind of offi-
6ial lawlessness . . ..." 10 Cal. 3d at 286, 515 P.2d at 11, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 211. In
spite of this and because Judge Geiler presented evidence showing a somewhat diligent
record with no blemish of dishonesty or corruption upon it, he was not forbidden from
thereafter practicing law in California. Id. at 287, 515 P.2d at 12, 110 Cal. Rptr. at
212.
126. 13 Cal. 3d 778, 532 P.2d 1209, 119 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1975).
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[Spruance] has under the color of judicial office committed petty, vin-
dicative, vulgar and otherwise unjudicial acts.
127
In reaching its determination as to the appropriate sanction for Judge
Spruance, the court inexplicably re-worded the already clear definition of
"bad faith" that had been put forward in Geiler. This was all the more
surprising because the offenses committed by Spruance were flagrant-
violations of the Geiler standards, and thus, with the possibility of con-'
fusion in the balance, there was no apparent need for redefinition.
Recall that in Geiler the court declared:
By 'bad faith,'. . . we mean -a pervasive course of conduct [by a judge]
of overreaching his authority over subordinates, [in which the judge]
intentionally committed acts which he knew or should have known were
beyond his lawful power. 
1 2
In contrast to this simple yet effective definition, the court in Spruance
stated:
'[B]ad faith' entails actual malice as the motivation for a judge's acting
ultra vires. The requisite intent must exceed mere volition; negligence
alone, if not so gross as to call its genuineness into question, falls short
of 'bad faith.' 'Bad faith' also encompasses acts within the lawful power
of a judge which nevertheless are committed for a corrupt purpose, i.e.,
for any purpose other than the faithful discharge of judicial duties. In
sum, 'bad faith' is quintessentially a concept of specific intent, requiring
consciousness of purpose as an antecedent to a judge's acting maliciously
or corruptly.1
29
The Spruance definition of "bad faith" interjected several new and
potentially confusing concepts: (1) "actual malice;" (2) "exceeding
mere volition;" (3) "specific intent;" and (4) "consciousness of
purpose."
As a result of the new language in Spruance, some concern has arisen
as to whether the court intended to merely restate the original Geiler
127. Id. at 795, 532 P.2d at 1220-21, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 852-53, Judge Spruance, like
Judges Geiler and McCartney, wilfully mistreated Deputy Public Defenders, as well as
other persons in his courtroom. He also had dismissed or otherwise favorably altered
the disposition of cases involving friends, or relatives of friends. He tampered with the
court records in one case involving his own traffic offense. In addition, he appointed
private attorneys on many occasions to defend persons, at the court's expense, without
first determining whether the Public Defender should be called in. Moreover, the ap-
pointments were primarily given to his acquaintances and political backers and not dis-
tributed fairly among the eligible attorneys on the basis of merit. Id. at 789-94,.532
P.2d at 1216-20, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 845-52.
128. 10 Cal. 3d 270, 286, 515 P.2d 1, 11, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201, 211 (1973).
129. 13 Cal. 3d at 796, 532 P.2d at 1221, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
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definition in new words, or whether the court actually intended to con-
vey some new meaning and thereby change the test of "bad faith" in
judicial disciplinary proceedings. s0 If there is a new meaning in-
tended, the further question arises: In view of the "actual malice" and
"specific intent" language in Spruance, what has become of that part
of the Geller definition of "bad faith" which says, "petitioner intention-
ally committed acts which he . . . [reasonably] should have known
were beyond his lawful power?"' 3 ' In other words, are each of the
phrases "actual malice," "specific intent" and "consciousness of pur-
pose" under Spruance equivalent to the one phrase used in Geiler,
"intentionally committed?" Or does the language in Spruance now
limit a finding of "bad faith" to just those situations where a judge
specifically intends to and does commit an act which he knew to be
beyond his lawful power?' If the court has intended to create a new
meaning for "bad faith," then the Spruance rule is considerably stricter
than that of Geiler; the unfortunate and inevitable effect of such a
change would be to limit the Commission's effectiveness by making
fewer those acts classifiable as "willful misconduct."
In spite of the plain meaning of "actual malice, "specific intent,"
and "consciousness of purpose," there are certain fMctors in Spruance
that indicate the court really did not intend to change the Geiler defini-
tion. First, the Spruance language was stated immediately after and
in apparent explanation of the Geiler definition of "bad faith."'' 3
Second, the court, finding "willful misconduct" in Judge Spruance's
abusive mistreatment of one attorney (who had filed a motion to dis-
qualify Spruance) stated "[i]t goes without saying that as a judge, peti-
tioner should have known the proper method of handling [such a
motion.]"'34  Third, there is the sentence in Spruance concerning
"negligence . . . so gross as to call its genuineness into question
;,,186 it is not clear, however, whether mere gross negligence would
be sufficient to sustain a finding of specific intent, or whether it simply
raises a question as to bad faith, but is not conclusive of it under Geiler.
Regardless of what the court's intention actually was, one thing remained
certain: Following Spruance the concept of "bad faith" was in a state
130. Interview with Kent L. Richland, Deputy Attorney General of California (ex-
aminer in Cannon), in Los Angeles, July 8, 1975. [Hereinafter cited as Richland
Interview 7/8/751.
131. 10 Cal. 3d 270, 286, 515 P.2d 1, 11, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201, 211 (emphasis added).
132. Richland Interview 7/8/75, supra note 130.
133. 13 Cal. 3d 778, 795-96, 532 P.2d 1209, 1221, 119 Cal. Rptr. 841, 853.
134. Id. at 797, 532 P.2d at 1222, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
135. Id. at 796, .532 P.2d at 1221, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
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of confusion. It was hoped by many concerned that this problem would
be taken care of by the court in Cannon, but unfortunately this was
not done.
B. Mitigation
Concerning the substantive charges of misconduct in McCartney, the
petitioner was found to have committed numerous acts constituting both
"willful misconduct" and "prejudicial conduct." He was also found to
have committed many unjudicial acts which, although not classifiable
as "prejudicial conduct," because they were not damaging to the public
esteem of the courts, were nevertheless wholly deplorable.'38 Much
of Judge McCartney's wrongful conduct arose out of an on-going feud
between him and the Public Defender's office as well as certain defend-
ants. As a first line of defense, the judge alleged that his conduct was
excusable because he had been seriously provoked by those persons
whom he had eventually mistreated. The court vehemently rejected
this contention, saying that under no circumstances may a judge allow
his personal reactions over behavior in his courtroom to interfere with
his impartial administration of justice.'37 Secondly, the judge stressed
that he had been on the bench for only one and one-half years when
the initial proceedings in the matter were begun. The court felt per-
136. 12 Cal. 3d at 531-36, 526 P.2d at 281-85, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 273-77. Briefly,
Judge McCartney was found by clear and convincing evidence to have grossly mistreated
many persons in his courtroom (including attorneys, defendants, and court employees)
by addressing them in abusive language; to have improperly prevented certain defend-
ants and their counsel from filing motions under CAL. CODE CIV. Pao. § 170.1 (West
1970) (to have him disqualified as a judge on their particular matter); to have assumed
the role of an advocate in matters in which he was the judge; and to have become a
witness in such matters. He was also proved to have been incessantly whistling, hum-
ming, and muttering profanities aloud "to himself" during courtroom proceedings; and
on at least one occasion he was disrespectful and offensive toward the court's presiding
judge in the presence of others. As to these last three items the court could not find
official misconduct that was sanctionable. This was because there had been no showing
of a substantial impairment to the public esteem for the judicial office as a result of
these acts. In view of the fact that members of the public were constantly present in
Judge McCartney's courtroom and were forced to endure his displeasing idiosyncrasies,
it is astonishing that the court reached the conclusion it did, especially after describing
the activities as deplorable. iSee note 152 infra. This type of behavior is innately can-
cerous to the judicial image and one wonders whether there was any public esteem left
in Judge McCartney's court to be substantially impaired. Was such a showing really
required? It seems obvious that the very occurrence of the acts is sufficient proof of
their adverse effect upon the public image of the judiciary. Similarly, the court found
itself unable to do anything about the gross inefficiency in the way Judge McCartney
apparently ran his court. See note 141 infra.
137. 12 Cal. 3d at 537-39, 526 P.2d at 286-87, 116 Cal. Rptr. at Z78-79,
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suaded that much of the prejudicial conduct could have been due to
mere inexperience and to some extent was excusable. What was even
more significant to the court was the fact that, in many ways, Judge
McCartney had demonstrated "unusual care in attempting to 'do justice'
in the cases before him . . ." and had striven for "fundamental fairness
in his sentencing."'" It was the court's opinion that "[s]uch obvious
c6immitment to fairness and innovative procedural reform . . . is to
be encouraged and may. . . properly be considered. . . in mitigation
of proven misconduct . . . . 139 On the strength of these mitigating
factors, the court denied the Commission's recommendation for re-
moval and imposed the sanction of public censure.'40
* Although not specifically stated by the court, it was nonetheless clear
that what had been said regarding mitigation applied only to prejudicial
'conduct of the judge. It could not have held true for his willful miscon-
duct, because those acts were committed in manifest bad faith.
Reviewing the substantive aspects of the McCartney decision, several
important points emerge: (1) There were certain very bad acts com-
mitted by the judge as to which the court felt powerless to impose
disciplinary sanctions; 4' (2) it was established that provocation can be
138. Id. at 539-40, 526 P.2d at 287, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
Where a jail sentence for a minor misdemeanor violation might result in defendant's
-loss of employment he imposed a weekend sentence. If a fine was to be imposed
upon a defendant for whom payment in one sum would be unduly harsh, petitioner
often permitted payment ... over a period of time. He was liberal in assigning
first-time vehicle offenders to traffic school. He has also showed (sic) unusual in-
itiative in creating opportunities for rehabilitative treatment of alcoholic defendants.
He personally established a system whereby the municipal.court judges could rou-
tinely refer alcoholics to local . . . programs and [he personally] monitored the
defendants' participation in rehabilitation.
-d. at 539-40, 526 P.2d at 287, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
139. Id. at 540, 526 P.2d at 288, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
140. Id. In denying the Commission's recommendation, the court was persuaded to
give greater weight to the recommendation of the" special masters that censure rather
than removal be imposed. Id. This seemed somewhat contrary to the implications
made in Geiler (see note 80 supra and accompanying text), and, in effect, served to
undermine the Commission. It was probably this holding that prompted the Commis-
sion's recommendation that CAL. R. CT. 912 be amended. See note 57 supra and accom-
panying text.
141. As pointed out in note 136 supra, Judge McCartney was also charged and found
to have run his courtroom in a grossly inefficient manner. For example, it often took
him as long as fifteen minutes to rule upon a simple evidentiary objection. Despite the
substantial evidence in this regard, the court found that since no bad faith was involved
-(quite the contrary-the court found that his ineptness stemmed from "an effort to at-
tain a degree of diligence and studiousness . . . which was unrealistic and frequently
unjustified"), this form of judicial "misconduct" was not the proper subject of discipline.
12 Cal. 3d at 536, 526 P.2d at 285, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 277. The burden of handling
the problem was placed on the presiding judges of the local courts who were thought
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no defense for bad faith misconduct; (3) shortness of tenure is clearly
only available to "mitigate" certain offenses falling into the "prejudicial
conduct" category and not those constituting "willful misconduct;" and
(4) those highly commendable actions of Judge McCartney which the
court found could be considered in mitigation of his "proven miscon.
duct" must be recognized as truly exceptional and unusual-even
among judges.1"2
Just as the court's opinion in Spruance had muddied the waters with
respect to "bad faith," so it stirred them up in the area of "mitigation."
Discussing the judge's attempt to exonerate himself, the court stated
in unequivocal terms consistent with the implied statement of
McCartney: 43 "Tlhere can be no mitigation for maliciously moti-
vated judicial conduct."'1 44  Accordingly, since Judge Spruance was
found to have acted in bad faith on numerous occasions, and since the
court could not ". . . conceive that there are any circumstances in
which bad faith itself can be excused by extraneous circumstances," no
credit whatsoever was given to Spruance's assertions of mitigating
circumstances. 45
This very desirable holding was brought into serious question,
however, by a remark later in the court's opinion:
We find . . . [Judge Spruance's] motives far worse than in . . .
McCartney, where we were persuaded that mitigating factors success-
fully rebutted any inference of bad faith
146
Placed alongside one another, these two pronouncements appear to
be and in fact are contradictory. One wonders what the court intended
in this regard. Is it saying that when McCartney was decided, mitiga-
tion of willful misconduct was possible through an extraordinary show-
ing of redeeming qualities, but that under Spruance even such a
showing would not serve to mitigate maliciously motivated judicial con-
better able to cope with it. Id. This raises the question of whether there is a basis in
both these areas of judicial shortcomings for expanding the Commission's powers to
provide suitable remedies. It is doubtful that presiding judges could be effective in this
regard. See Boisvert, The Unwritten Appeal: An Injustice to Judges, L.A. Times, Sept.
3, 1975, Part H, at 7, cols. 1-5.
142. In view of the extraordinary nature of Judge McCartney's mitigating behavior,
this writer questions to what extent the potentially dangerous doctrine of "mitigating be-
havior" should be employed, if the Commission is not to be functionally weakened. See
text accompanying note 147 infra.
143. See text following note 140 supra.
144. 13 Cal. 3d at 800, 532 P.2d at 1224, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
145. Id.
146, Id..at 802, 532 P.2d at 1W25, 119 Cal. Rptr. at $57,
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duct? Or is the court saying that it is only because Judge Spruance's
motives were "far worse" than McCartney's that no consideration was
given to possible mitigating circumstances? That is, are there now two
levels of willful misconduct, the maliciously motivated and far worse
Spruance variety which is non-mitigable, and the ordinary, not-so-bad
McCartney variety which is mitigable? To put it another way, has the
prerequisite for allowing mitigation been changed from a finding of
extraordinary redeeming qualities, as it was in McCartney, to one of
non-malicious motivation, as was apparently used in Spruance? Or are
both standards now a prerequisite? Or did the court even stop to con-
sider the ramifications of what it was saying?
In an attempt to reconcile the confusion spawned in the Spruance
opinion, one must commence with an assessment of the ultimate desir-
ability of "mitigation" as a defense in judicial disciplinary proceedings.
This writer suggests that there might be certain rare instances (such
as in McCartney) where mitigation could be justified, but as a general
proposition it should be abandoned. Even in McCartney, where the
mitigating circumstances were of a highly unusual and commendable
nature, the actual suffering and abuse endured by those persons whom
Judge McCartney so cavalierly mistreated was in no manner lessened
because of the so-called "mitigating circumstances." Keeping sight of
the fact that it is the general public and court personnel who suffer as
a result of a judge's misbehavior and are the ones sought to be pro-
tected by the Commission, it is inherently destructive of the Comis-
sion's purpose to allow mitigation in any but the most extreme cir-
cumstances.' 4 7
147. It is also important to note that the doctrine of "mitigation," by definition, has
nothing whatever to do with "rebutting" inferences of "bad faith," as the Spruance Court
suggested. Id.
In McCartney, the court concluded that in at least four general areas the petitioner
had committed numerous specific acts of "willful misconduct." In every instance, a
finding of "bad faith" was a prerequisite to drawing such a conclusion. Thus, the so-
called "mitigating circumstances" played no part in making the initial determination as
to whether any "willful (i.e., "bad faith") misconduct" had occurred. (In fact, in the
absence of such a finding, there would have been nothing to "mitigate"). It is only
after a finding of "willful misconduct" had been made that the "mitigating circum-
stances" were permitted for consideration in counter-balancing, or neutralizing, the effect
of the proven "bad faith" involved. The distinction is critical, because if the "rebuttal"
language of Spruance is taken literally, then in making its determination as to "bad
faith" in any given instance, the court will have to consider whether extraneous acts of
good faith "rebut" the inference of "bad faith" which arise out of the act itself. Yet,
such was declared not to be the rule in another part of the opinion. Id. at 800, 532
P.2d at 1124, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 856. On the other hand, if the McCartney rule is to
be followed, as would be proper, then the determination of "bad faith" should be made
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C. Prejudicial Conduct
The court in Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications
148
seems inadvertently to have worked itself into a problematic posture
with regard to prejudicial conduct. One of the charges relating to
Judge Cannon's so-called "bizarre conduct" alleged that in 1974, she
[h]ad summoned security and maintenance personnel to her apartment
to lodge a complaint. During a half hour confrontation she directed
profanities to the manager, including, 'I'm going to shoot you, George,
you son of a bitch. And you are going to slowly die."
149
Judge Cannon argued unsuccessfully that such conduct, while admit-
tedly proven, could not constitute "prejudicial conduct" because it was
committed in the privacy of her own home. The court reasoned
obscurely that since she had summoned the men and had raucously
tiraded them, the event was somehow not carried out in the privacy
of her abode.15 The real problem, apparently overlooked by the
Judge Cannon, was that since she was not acting in a judicial
capacity, in order to label her action as "prejudicial conduct" under the
controlling Geiler definition, it was required that the evidence prove
that she had willfully misconducted herself (i.e. that she had acted out
of actual malice, or that she knew or should have known that what she
was doing was unlawful)."' But there was no proof to this effect.
Consequently, the court's conclusion of prejudicial conduct in this regard
appears unfounded according to the standards set in Geiler.
This raises important questions of policy: What precisely is the
meaning of "bad faith" in this context, and what should it be? If the
judge must act beyond his lawful power, or with actual malice, as
present rules dictate, very little of the non-judicially related behavior
which the Geiler court was obviously aiming to include under "prejudi-
entirely apart from any considerations of "mitigating circumstances." Regretably, the
opinion in Cannon sheds no new light on the subject.
In passing, it is noteworthy that the idea of "mitigation" is already being grossly
abused, for example, Judge Cannon offered in mitigation 'of her atrocious behavior
the facts that she had graduated from Stanford Law School and that she had once been
employed by the California Department of Corporations.
148. 14 Cal. 3d 678, 537 P.2d 898, 122 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1975). The Cannon
opinion consists mainly of a thorough recitation of the court's own findings and
conclusions. The full details of Judge Cannon's incredible behavior are set out in exten-
sive footnotes in the opinion. See especially id. at 682 n.4, 537 P.2d at 900 n.4, 122
Cal. Rptr. at 780 n.4.
149. Cannon Pet'n, supra note 112, at 50-51.
150. 14 Cal. 3d at 704-05, 537 P.2d at 916, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
151. Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 284 n.11, 515
P.2d 1, 9 n.11, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201, 209 n.11 (1973).
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cial conduct" would come within the definition. Yet, as the Cannon
holding clearly indicates, the court considers that certain improper out-
of-court activity by a judge should be subject to discipline. In light of
this conflict, it is suggested that, at the very least, a separate definition
of "bad faith" (as it relates to "prejudicial conduct") is needed.
A preferable approach would be to eliminate the concept of "bad
faith" entirely from this phase of judicial misconduct. It seems suffici-
ent that any conduct committed anywhere by a judge which is so offen-
sive as to bring the judiciary into disesteem ought to be sanctionable,
regardless of the mens rea involved. There is certainly ample support
for this position in the various codes of judicial ethics and conduct.1
2
. There were also two other proven charges of "bizarre conduct" which
easily came within the Geiler rule, but were found by the court not
to constitute "prejudicial conduct." In one instance Judge Cannon had
for a number of months in 1972 kept a "[mjechanical canary in her
chambers. The chirping of the device was audible during proceedings
in the courtroom through the partially open chamber door."3 In the
other instance, "[p]etitioner . . . , during the summer and fall of 1972
and early part of 1973, brought a small dog to the courtroom. She
either held the dog or maintained it under the bench while court was
in session.' 5 4  Unquestionably, this conduct was committed while the
judge was acting in her judicial capacity. Although no inference of
152. Canon Two of the ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDu C states: "A Judge Should
Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities" (emphasis
added). Paragraph one of Canon Two enlarges the basic precept: "A judge
should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judici-
ary" (emphasis added). The commentary to Canon Two adds: "Public confidence
in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A judge
must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. He must expect to be
thesubject of constant public scrutiny. He must therefore accept restrictions on his con-
duct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely
and willingly."
-This general proposition was noted with approval both in Geiler and Spruance. See
note 125 supra; cf. Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 14 Cal. 3d 678,
697 n.22, 537 P.2d 898, 918 n.22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 778, 798 n.22 (1975).
. 153. As the Attorney General phrased it, "[tihe bird's sound was a source of com-
ment and wonderment for those in the courtroom." Respondent's Brief at 66, Cannon
v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 14 Cal. 3d 678, 537 P.2d 898, 122 Cal. Rptr.
778 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Resp. Br., Cannon]. See Cannon v. Commission on
Judicial Qualifications, 14 Cal. 3d 678, 703-04, 537 P.2d 898, 915-16, 122 Cal. Rptr.
778, 795-96 (1975).
154. Cannon Pet'n, supra note 112, at 48-9; Resp. Br., Cannon, supra note 153, at
65, 69;'see Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 14 Cal. 3d 678, 703-04,
537 P.2d 898, 915-16, 122 Cal. Rptr. 778, 795-96 (1975).
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"bad faith" can be drawn here, there is little doubt that the aural
presence in the courtroom of a mechanical bird (kept chirping all day
long at the judge's specific instruction) and the physical presence of
a canine is detrimental to the judicial image. As such, it is "prejudicial
conduct." The court itself emphatically stated that this conduct was
"clearly improper in a judicial atmosphere."'155 One wonders how it
could have reached this conclusion and still found the behavior to be
not "prejudicial to the public esteem of the judicial office."'
150
On reflection, it appears that what the court has done in these
instances is to look at the "gut-level' seriousness of the particular con-
duct, rather than at the rules it has established, in determining what
constitutes "prejudicial conduct." That is, having applied the wrong
test as to the apartment conduct, a relatively more serious offense, and
having found it to be "prejudicial," the court, using the same standard,
could not very well have found that the canary-and-dog conduct, a rela-
tively less serious offense, was also prejudicial, although it took place
in the courtroom and clearly came within the Geiler rule.
In both Spruance and Cannon the evidence was so strong and the
misconduct was so egregious that removal was inevitable. Unfortun-
ately, but probably on this account, the court has become inattentive,
failing to apply consistently the rules it has established and disregarding
the dangers of carelessly chosen language. Some confusion and contra-
dictions have already resulted from this, and it is hoped the court will
recognize and remedy the situation before more problems arise. This
is particularly crucial in the formative years of this new area of law.
VI. ACA 96
The most recent major development in the area of California judicial
discipline occurred in November, 1976, when the electorate adopted
ACA 96, a proposed constitutional amendment which embodies expan-
sive revisions of the existing system. 117  One sorely needed change
effected by the amendment was the bestowal upon the. Commission of a
new name: The Commission on Judicial Performance. 158 Hopefully,
this modification will enable the general public and practicing attorneys
to identify the Commission with its actual function-the monitoring of
judicial performance.
155. 14 Cal. 3d at 703-04, 537 P.2d at 915-16, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 795-96.
156. See note 125 supra.
157. ACA 96, supra note 35.
158. Id.
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Another, and perhaps the most significant change, brought by the
passage of ACA 96 involved a provision which empowers the Commis-
sion to issue (not merely to recommend) a form of sanction called
"private admonishment" in situations where a judge is found to have
engaged in an improper action or a dereliction of duty.'39 This addi-
tion to the Commission's powers is especially meaningful because it
increases the Commission's capacity to deal with disciplinary problems
of a relatively less serious nature. Although these problems constitute
the majority of judicial offenses, they have previously not fallen within
the constitutional criteria for discipline, as defined by the California
Supreme Court.' Regrettably, however, the private admonition has
been made subject to supreme court review. 10' Although this feature
will detract somewhat from the usefulness of the sanction, its mere
existence marks the taking of a considerable step forward.
A third change was made with regard to enlarging the grounds upon
which a judge could be disciplined. Now, a judge may be sanctioned
for an "inability" to perform judicial duties, whereas in the past only a
"willful and persistent failure" of performance could lead to discipline.
Moreover, the requirement of a "willful" failure has been dropped,
making state of mind irrelevant-as it should be.'
62
The final noteworthy modification embodied in ACA 96 is that
from now on a panel of seven appellate court justices will determine
matters of discipline involving a member of the supreme court.'1
3
VII. CONCLUSION
Before drawing conclusions from which constructive recommendation
may be fashioned, it is meaningful to consider judicial discipline
contextually-in light of the overall administration of justice. On the
one hand, the power judges wield is undeniably awesome. It is also
undeniable that some judges abuse that power by misbehaving, while
others are incapacitated and some incapable of handling it. 601 Because
159. Id.
160. Frankel-Accountability, supra note 71, at 414, 430.
161. ACA 96, supra note 35,
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. [We must be realistic enough to recognize that judges, like all of us . . .
are human. Some are lazy. Some become ill and fail to realize that they are no
longer capable of performing their duties properly. Some, after many years of dis
tinguished service, become senile. Some drink too much. And some-very few-
may succumb to temptation and sell justice to the highest bidder.
Excerpt from Senator Joseph D. Tydings' address to the 1966 Nat'l Conf. of Bar Presi-
dents, reprinted in 49 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 236 (1966).
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of this, the public's compelling need to have these types of judges elimi-
nated or rehabilitated is self-evident, and itself justifies a strong regu-
latory body.
On the other hand, the importance of an independent judiciary is
tremendous: In a very real sense the continued success of American
jurisprudence depends on it. Inevitably, however, the greater a com-
mission's power of discipline over judges becomes, the greater is the
chance that their independence will be compromised. 10 5 Finally, the
inherent and insurmountable limitations of any regulatory body such as
the Commission must be acknowledged and respected, for a "commis-
sion" can only be expected to do so much. Prior to and beyond certain
points there must be other safeguards to ensure progressive development
in the administration of justice.
166
Given that the institution of judicial discipline is here to stay, and that
the opposing public policies and natural limitations noted above are
always at work, the question which must be constantly asked and re-
answered is: Should the Commission be given more or less power?
Similarly, should it be extended more or less independence? It is clear
that the general public, the bar, and the bench as well, will be best
served to the extent that the Commission's fullest potential is actualized.
Realistically, the most that can presently be said of judicial discipline
in California is that a modest and commendable beginning has been
made.' 6 7  Essentially, there are two ways in which the Commission's
effectiveness can be increased. One is by the legislature, and the other
165. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 410 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
166. In this regard California could do much to improve the process by which judges
are selected. If selections were made solely on the basis of qualifications, instead of
the numerous other factors which result in judgeships, then many of the judges who
might become the subject of Commission inquiry and court discipline could be screened
out initially. See Hufstedler, A Better Method of Approving Appointment of Appellate
Judges, 49 CAL.. ST. B.J. 104 (1974); Thompson, Selection of Judges of the California
Court of Appeal, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 381 (1973); cf. Brown, Governor's View of Judicial
Selection, 49 L.A.B. BuLL. 405 (1974); see also Nelson, Variations on a Theme-Selec-
tion and Tenure of Judges, 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 4 (1962).
Another mode of improving judicial performance is through educational programs de-
signed to give judges the specialized knowledge they need to function efficiently. (Here,
there is little difference between a medical specialist and a judge; medical specialists are
required to have extended training, why aren't judges?). California has begun to do
quite a lot in this area. A Center for Judicial Education and Research (CJER) has
been established in Berkeley. Many courses and materials, similar to those given by
the Continuing Education of The Bar, are supplied by the CIER. See Li, New Look
in 'California Judicial Education, 49 L.A.B. BuLL. 421 (1974).
167. See Frankel-Accountability, supra note 71, at 430.
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is by the court. As pointed out in some detail above, there is much that
the California Supreme Court can presently do to help solidify and
improve the system as it now exists. For instance, instead of refusing
to utilize sanctions as it has in the past,'68 the court could start playing
a more active and meaningful role by taking genuine responsibility and
initiative in this area. Additionally, the court will have the continuing
opportunity in future years to thoughtfully and creatively work with the
new tools provided through ACA 96.
Finally, an openness to new and better forms of discipline and pro-
cedure, and a willingness to try them, should be maintained. Through
adopting these attitudes, and carrying them into action, the position of
California as a leader in the field of judicial discipline will be assured.
Such results are more than worth the relatively small amount of time and
consistent effort required to achieve them.
Wilbank J. Roche
168. See McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512, 535-
37, 526 P.2d 268, 284-85, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 276-77 (1974) (where the court found
the judge's behavior deplorable but would not sanction him); note 136 supra.
In some respects, it is just as well that the court has decided not to take initiative.
Having failed to do so, the burden is placed squarely upon the legislature to broaden
the Commission's powers. If such expansion is made, it will tend to be more secure
than a judicial broadening that could easily be reversed with a change of the court's
make-up. In this manner, a recurrence of the unfortunate result in Stevens (see text
accompanying notes 37-38 supra) would be virtually impossible. Telephone Interview
with Jack E. Frankel, Executive Secretary of the California Commission on Judicial
Qualifications, in San Francisco August 6, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Frankel Interview
8/6/75] (Grateful acknowledgment is made to Mr. Frankel for his kind cooperation in
supplying various information and materials used in the preparation of this article. It
should be noted, however, that the opinions stated herein are the author's alone, and
they do not necessarily reflect those of Mr. Frankel or any past or present member of
the Commission, unless specifically so indicated).
